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Caselaw Developments 2015 
0VERVIEW1 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that an opinion can be false, for 
securities law purposes, if the speaker or writer disbelieves the opinion when de-
livering it, if the opinion includes embedded facts that are false, or if, in context, 
a reasonable investor would be misled by the omission of material facts relating 
to the opinion, such as the analysis or investigation on which it is based. 2 
SEC rulemahing. The D.C. Circuit held invalid, as violating the First Amend-
ment, the portion of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act") and implementing regulation that required pub-
lic companies to include in their conflict minerals disclosures statements that 
certain products were not "DRC conflict free. "3 
SEC enforcement actions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a judgment that a pub-
lic relations firm aided and abetted a client's Rule lOb-5 violation and that the 
public relations firm had violated the registration requirement by selling stock 
with which the client paid for services. 4 Both the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh 
Circuit rejected attempts by respondents in administrative enforcement proceed-
ings before the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC' or "Commission") 
to enjoin those proceedings on constitutional grounds by lawsuits that the re-
spondents filed in federal district courts. 5 
Proxy solicitation. The Third Circuit ruled that the "ordinary business opera-
tions" exception to Rule l 4a-8 permitted Wal-Mart to exclude from its proxy ma-
terials a shareholder resolution designed to discourage the retailer from selling 
firearms with ten-round magazines. 6 
Forward-looking statements. The D.C. Circuit ruled that warning language ac-
companying statements about inventory were not "meaningful" so as to invoke 
the statutory protections for forward-looking statements where the warnings 
did not disclose that the issuer was holding large amounts of obsolete product 
1. The caselaw developments section covers opinions decided during the calendar year 2015. 
Where this portion of the annual review expresses opinions, they are those of the author of the case-
law developments, William 0. Fisher, and not necessarily the opinions of other authors contributing 
to the annual review, or of members of the subcommittee producing the review, or of the American 
Bar Association. 
2. See infra notes 29-65 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 66-79 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 82-129 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 130-62 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 163-96 and accompanying text. 
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that it could not sell without heavy discounts. 7 The Eighth Circuit found an 
issuer's statements that a federal regulator would protect the exclusivity of a 
product to be "forward-looking" and that the issuer's cautions were "meaning-
ful," in a case where the agency later declined to enforce the exclusivity. 8 
Insider trading. Reacting to the 2014 Newman decision by the Second Circuit, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the intangible benefit one family member derives 
from making a gift to another family member suffices for the personal benefit 
the original tipper must receive, and of which the tippee must know, in order 
for the tippee to be liable under the traditional theory of insider trading. 9 
Materiality. The D.C. Circuit held that a representation of "very strong sales" 
was material, rejecting the issuer's argument that the statement constituted mere 
puffery, where the issuer was accumulating obsolete inventory of the product to 
which the statement referred. 10 The Second Circuit ruled that statements about 
an acquisition-including that "[t]here are a lot of areas where [the acquired 
company] just goes ching, ching, ching"-were puffery, and also held (although 
the panel divided on this ruling) that, where the market knew a bank needed to 
raise capital in the face of deteriorating conditions during the credit crisis, the 
difference between whether a regulator "required" the bank to raise capital ver-
sus "encouraged" the bank to do so was immaterial. 11 The First Circuit held that 
a thin showing of materiality argued against a finding of scienter, 12 and both the 
First and the Second Circuits suggested that a defendant, in at least some con-
texts, can challenge the materiality of misrepresentations in transactions between 
professionals in the financial industry even if professionals in that industry-
who were involved in the transactions at issue-testify that the misrepresenta-
tions were important to them. 13 
Duty to disclose. Disagreeing with a Ninth Circuit decision published in 2014, the 
Second Circuit held that Regulation S-K Item 303(a)(3)(ii) defines a duty to dis-
close, the violation of which can support a Rule lOb-5 claim, provided that the 
omitted facts are material and the other elements of a Rule 1 Ob-5 case are proved. 14 
Scienter and scienter pleading. Courts of Appeals addressed scienter in cases 
where plaintiffs asserted Rule lOb-5 claims criticizing (i) accounting, (ii) other 
financial disclosures, and (iii) statements by issuers in the drug and medical de-
vice industry. The Ninth and Second Circuits addressed (iv) more general scien-
ter questions. 
Four notable decisions addressed scienter in cases involving alleged account-
ing wrongdoing. The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to adequately 
plead scienter where they asserted that the issuer reported $100 million in 
7. See infra notes 204-29 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 230-50 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 251-66 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 273-76 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 2 77-9 5 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 296-311 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 296-331 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 332-56 and accompanying text. 
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cash but defaulted on a $3.5 million debt. 15 The Second Circuit found insuffi-
cient allegations that an auditor of a China-based company acted with severe 
recklessness in failing to compare the financial results that the company submit-
ted to a Chinese regulator with the results in the statements that the auditor au-
dited for submission to the SEC. 16 The Tenth Circuit found wanting scienter al-
legations against a company that delayed disclosing a billing dispute with a 
major customer until information about the dispute, which occurred in a foreign 
country, escalated to the company's U.S. headquarters, management conducted 
an investigation, and the company resolved the billing with the customer. 17 The 
Fifth Circuit rejected scienter allegations as inadequate in a case based signifi-
cantly on asserted misvaluation of mortgage-backed securities, with the court 
emphasizing that such valuations required subjective judgments. 18 
In an additional case where plaintiffs alleged financial fraud, the Tenth Circuit 
ruled that plaintiffs adequately pled severe recklessness when a chief executive 
officer ("CEO") allegedly mischaracterized the reason a strategic investor de-
clined to complete the purchase of an interest in the issuer's assets, with the 
court rejecting the CEO's argument that he was acting on behalf of the company 
and its shareholders by couching his disclosure in terms calculated to preserve 
the issuer's opportunity to sell the interest to some other party at a high price. 19 
Two decisions considered scienter allegations against issuers in the drug and 
medical device industry. The First Circuit found no adequate scienter pleading 
where a company said-during a long-running interaction with the Food and 
Drug Administration ("FDA") over off-label promotion-that the company had 
a policy against off-label marketing and that it was cooperating with the 
FDA. 20 The Fourth Circuit found scienter properly pled where the defendants 
specifically described a meeting with the FDA and an FDA briefing document 
but, in each case, left out information that showed a decreased chance that 
the agency would approve the issuer's drugn 
Finally, two cases addressed more general scienter issues. The Ninth Circuit 
considered when the scienter of an officer can be imputed to his or her corpo-
ration. The court held that the "adverse interest" exception to such imputation 
does not apply where the officer communicates with investors with apparent au-
thority created by the companyn The Second Circuit decided that scienter does 
not require an intent to harm. 23 
Primary violation of Rule lOb-5 (b). The Seventh Circuit held that ]anus ap-
plies to determine which corporate officers "made" statements for purposes 
of Rule lOb-S(b), and considered how the ]anus test-of actual control over 
15. See infra notes 370-82 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 383-406 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 407-24 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 425-55 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 456-68 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 469-500 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 501-29 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 530-39 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 540-43 and accompanying text. 
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content and dissemination-identifies appropriate officer defendants in pri-
vate lawsuits based on press releases and other corporate disclosures. 24 
Loss causation and reliance in open market cases. The Seventh Circuit set out a 
protocol of shifting burdens of proof to account for non-fraud, firm-specific in-
formation in econometric models used for loss causation and damages. 25 In the 
same case, the appellate court affirmed the manner in which a trial court-in a 
second phase of a trial, following a first phase directed to class-wide issues-
provided the defense with an opportunity to challenge individual class member 
reliance on the integrity of the market.26 The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of dis-
cretion in trial court certification of one class in the BP oil spill securities litigation, 
where differences over whether certain disclosures were "corrective" raised common 
questions, and no abuse of discretion in the denial of a second class, where plain-
tiffs' theory required a class-member-by-class-member determination of whether 
the investor would have bought BP securities at all if the investor had known 
that the company had no effective plan to deal with a catastrophic blowout.27 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"). The Second Circuit set 
out an elaborate taxonomy of instances in which state-law claims might include 
an allegation that someone-whether a defendant or another actor-violated the 
anti-falsity provisions of the federal securities laws with respect to the purchase 
or sale of "covered securities," as SLUSA defines that term, and, for each cate-
gory, stated whether SLUSA precluded the allegation or not. 28 
SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES OPINIONS 
In Virginia Banhshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, the Supreme Court held directors' opin-
ions, that a cash-out merger of minority stockholders for $42 per share provided a 
"high" value and a "fair" price, were actionable as "facts" under section l 4(a) 
and Rule l 4a-9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").29 The 
Court reached that conclusion because those opinions were, in "a commercial 
context[,] reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis that justifie[d] 
them as accurate, the absence of which render[ed] them misleading."30 Thus, 
"whether $42 was 'high,' and the proposal 'fair' to the minority shareholders, 
depended on whether provable facts about the [issuer's] assets, and about actual 
24. See infra notes 544-64 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 575-90 and accompanying text (discussing loss causation and burden shifting); 
see also infra notes 571-604 and accompanying text (discussing the case generally). 
26. See infra notes 591-604 and accompanying text (discussing rebuttal of presumption of reli-
ance); see also infra notes 571-604 and accompanying text (discussing the case generally). 
27. See infra notes 605-28 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 629-60 and accompanying text. 
29. 501 U.S. 1083, 1088, 1091-95 (1991). Exchange Act section 14(a) makes it unlawful to use 
the mails or interstate commerce to solicit a proxy to vote a security registered under section 12 of 
that act if the solicitation violates rules prescribed by the SEC. 15 U.5.C. § 78n(a)(l) (2012). Rule 
l 4a-9 prohibits solicitations "containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact." 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.l 4a-9 (2015) (emphasis added). 
30. Virginia Banhshares, 501 U.S. at 1093. 
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and potential levels of operation, substantiated a value that was above, below, or 
more or less at the $42 figure, when assessed in accordance with recognized 
methods of valuation."31 
The Court considered "whether disbelief, or undisclosed belief or motivation, 
standing alone, should be a sufficient basis to sustain an action under § l 4(a), 
absent proof by objective evidence that the statement also expressly 
or impliedly asserted something false or misleading about its subject matter. "32 
Virginia Banhshares held that "proof of mere disbelief or belief undisclosed 
should not suffice for liability under§ 14(a)," but added that "it would be rare 
to find a case with evidence solely of disbelief or undisclosed motivation without 
further proof that the statement was defective as to its subject matter."33 The Vir-
ginia Banhshares opinion generated considerable controversy over whether an 
opinion, in order to be actionable under the securities laws, must be both sub-
jectively false in the sense that the speaker or author disbelieves the opinion and 
objectively false in the sense that the underlying facts the opinion implies are un-
true. This question is particularly important in (i) cases where plaintiffs sue 
under Rule lOb-5, because a claim under that rule includes a scienter element34 
that, by itself, seems to encompass subjective falsity when the case rests on de-
fendants' stated opinions, and (ii) cases where plaintiffs make a claim under sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), which does not require 
scienter, 35 and where therefore requiring subjective falsity appears to import a 
mental state that the cause of action does not include. 36 
In 2015, the Court revisited opinions in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Coun-
cil Construction Industry Pension Fund. 37 The plaintiffs brought a section 11 claim 
against the issuer for including in a registration statement (i) its "belie[f that] 
our contract arrangements with other healthcare providers, our pharmaceutical 
suppliers and our pharmacy practices are in compliance with applicable federal 
and state laws[,]" and (ii) its "belie[f that] our contracts with pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers are legally and economically valid arrangements. "38 The plaintiffs al-
leged that, in fact, Omnicare's contracts violated anti-kickback laws. 39 In reversing 
a district court dismissal, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs "had to allege 
31. Id. at 1094. 
32. Id. at 1095-96. 
33. Id. at 1096 (emphasis added). 
34. See infra note 357 and accompanying text. 
35. See In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010). 
36. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding, in a Rule 
lOb-5 action, that objective falsity sufficed to prove that an opinion was false, with any required sub-
jective falsity wrapped into the scienter analysis). Compare Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551 F.3d 
1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding opinions actionable, in a section 11 claim, "only if the complaint 
alleges ... that the statements were both objectively and subjectively false or misleading"). 
37. 135 S Ct. 1318 (2015) 
38. Id. at 1323. 
39. Id. at 1324. 
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only that the stated belief was 'objectively false'; they did not need to contend that 
anyone at Omnicare 'disbelieved [the opinion] at the time it was expressed."'40 
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light 
of its extended analysis.41 The majority opinion focused on the language of sec-
tion 11, which provides a cause of action where a registration statement, at the 
time it became effective, "contained an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading."42 Justice Kagan interpreted that 
section to impose liability in two instances-Ci) where the opinion constituted 
a false fact, 43 and (ii) where the opinion misled because it omitted material 
facts. 44 Because a statement of belief-such as a CEO's belief that his or her com-
pany's contracts comply with the law-"explicitly affirms one fact: that the 
speaker actually holds the stated belief," the stated belief "would subject the is-
suer to liability (assuming the misrepresentation were material)" if it "falsely de-
scribe [d the CEO's] state of mind."45 The complaint in Omnicare did not allege 
falsity in this first way because "the Funds d [id] not contest that Omnicare's 
opinion was honestly held" and could therefore not prevail simply by showing 
"that Omnicare's belief turned out to be wrong-that whatever the company 
thought, it was in fact violating anti-kickback laws. "46 As Justice Kagan put it, 
"a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an 'untrue statement of material 
fact,' regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong."47 
The majority acknowledged that a stated belief might also be false if it "con-
tain[ed] embedded statements of fact" (as where a CEO said "I believe our 
TVs have the highest resolution available because we use a patented technology 
to which our competitors do not have access") and the "supporting fact" was 
false (e.g., that the issuer did not use a patented technology). 48 But Omnicare's 
statements were "pure . . opinion[s]" that did not recite supporting facts. 49 
The majority, however, concluded that the plaintiffs might prevail on the al-
ternative theory that the issuer's statements of belief in its legal compliance were 
misleading because those statements omitted facts. so The Court held that "a rea-
sonable investor may, depending on the circumstances, understand an opinion 
statement to convey facts about how the speaker has formed the opinion-or, 
otherwise put, about the speaker's basis for holding that view. "51 If that were 
40. Id. (quoting Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers & Hod Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v. 
Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 
105, 110 (2d Cir. 2011))) 
41. Id. at 1333. 
42. 15 USC § 77k(a) (2012) 
4 3. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326-27. 
44. Id. at 1327-32. 
45. Id. at 1326. 




50. Id. at 1327-33. 
51. Id. at 1328. 
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the case, then, drawing on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "liability may result 
from omission of facts-for example, the fact that the speaker failed to conduct 
any investigation-that rebut the recipient's predictable inference. "52 Whether 
an expressed belief would lead a reasonable investor to understand some under-
lying basis for the speaker's opinion and, if so, what the reasonable investor 
would understand that basis to be will depend, the majority said, on context. 53 
Thus, an investor will assume that more careful analysis underlies an expressed 
belief in a "formal document[]" like a registration statement than in "off-the-cuff 
judgments," and an investor will also understand the analysis underlying an ex-
pressed opinion "in light of all its surrounding text, including hedges, disclaim-
ers, and apparently conflicting information" and "customs and practices of the 
relevant industry." 54 Moreover, whether a particular fact that cuts against an 
opinion renders the opinion misleading because that fact is not disclosed de-
pends on the omitted fact. Thus, if "in stating an opinion about legal compliance, 
the issuer did not disclose that a single junior attorney expressed doubts about a 
practice's legality, when six of his more senior colleagues gave a stamp of ap-
proval[,] [t]hat omission would not make the statement of opinion mislead-
ing, even if the minority position ultimately proved correct. "55 That is because a 
"reasonable investor does not expect that every fact known to an issuer supports 
its opinion statement. "56 The majority emphasized that, in order to assert this 
second basis for liability for an opinion, an "investor must identify particular 
(and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer's opinion-facts about the 
inquiry the issuer did or did not conduct or the knowledge it did or did not 
have-whose omission makes the opinion statement at issue misleading to a rea-
sonable person reading the statement fairly and in context. "57 
The plaintiffs alleged in Omnicare "that an attorney had warned [the company] 
that a particular contract 'carrie [d] a heightened risk' of legal exposure under 
anti-kickback laws."58 Thus, on remand, the lower court should "determine 
whether [the complaint] adequately alleged that Omnicare had omitted that 
(purported) fact, or any other like it, from the registration statement," taking 
into "consideration of such matters [(i)] as the attorney's status and expertise 
and other legal information available to Omnicare at the time ... [,(ii)] whatever 
facts Omnicare did provide about legal compliance, as well as [(iii)] any other 
hedges, disclaimers, or qualifications it included in its registration statement. "59 
52. Id. at 1330 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 cmt. a (AM. LAw INST. 1976)). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 1329. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1332. 
58. Id. at 1333 (quoting plaintiffs' complaint). 
59. Id. (with the last including, "for example, the information Omnicare offered that States had 
initiated enforcement actions against drug manufacturers for giving rebates to pharmacies, that the 
Federal Government had expressed concerns about the practice, and that the relevant laws 'could 
be interpreted in the future in a manner' that would harm Omnicare's business" (quoting registration 
statement)). 
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Significance and analysis. The most disturbing aspect of Omnicare is that the 
majority did not attempt to integrate its analysis with Virginia Banhshares. This 
is important in two respects. First, Virginia Banhshares held that an opinion can-
not be a "fact" at all-for securities law prohibitions against making untrue state-
ments of "fact"-unless the opinion is one that a reasonable investor would un-
derstand, in the relevant commercial context, to rest on proveable, underlying 
objective facts. 60 Omnicare does not address this holding and, presumably leaves 
it in place. Nevertheless, it is disturbing that the majority failed to expressly tie 
the Virginia Banhshares analysis into the Omnicare analysis in this obvious way. 
Second, Virginia Banhshares held expressly that subjective falsity is not enough 
to impose liability for an opinion. 61 The Omnicare majority held that an opinion 
is actionable if it is material and the author did not believe the opinion when he 
or she professed. 62 Seeking to reconcile this view with Virginia Banhshares, the 
majority characterized the earlier decision as dealing with "the rare hypothetical 
case ... in which a speaker expresses an opinion that she does not actually hold, 
but that turns out to be right."63 The Omnicare majority then conceded that Vir-
ginia Banhshares "qualifies" the Omnicare holding so that no violation occurs 
where the defendant, in stating a belief, thought "he was lying while actually 
(i.e., accidentally) telling the truth about the matter addressed in his opinion. "64 
This suggests that, in order to prevail on the theory that an opinion is false be-
cause the speaker or writer did not believe it, the plaintiff must plead and prove 
both that the defendant did not believe the opinion and that the opinion was 
objectively false. 65 On the other hand, where the plaintiff proceeds on the theory 
that the opinion is false because "embedded facts" are false, the plaintiff will not 
need to prove any subjective disbelief but only falsity of the embedded facts. 
Similarly, if the plaintiff proceeds on the theory that, in context, the opinion mis-
leads by omission, the plaintiff does not need to prove the speaker or writer dis-
believed his or her opinion, but only that the omitted fact was material and ren-
dered the opinion misleading. Omnicare does not address the relationship 
between falsity and scienter in a Rule lOb-5 action. 
SEC RULEMAKING 
The Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to adopt a regulation directing public 
companies to disclose information about conflict minerals necessary to the func-
tion or production of their products. 66 The SEC issued an elaborate implement-
60. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
62. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326-27. 
63. Id. at 1329 n.7. 
64. Id. at 1326 n.2. 
65. Perhaps, the majority meant that the objective truth is an affirmative defense. 
66. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) 
(2012)) 
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ing regulation. 67 In 2014, the D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to that regulation, 
with one exception.68 The exception held unconstitutional a requirement, in the 
statute and in the implementing regulation, that public companies identify cer-
tain products as not "DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] conflict free" in 
reports that the companies had to file with the SEC and post on their websites. 69 
After a subsequent decision in the same circuit upheld a requirement that meat 
product labels include country-of-origin, 70 the panel that had published the 
2014 opinion on the conflict minerals regulation reheard the constitutional chal-
lenge to that rulen In 2015, the panel (two to one) adhered to its 2014 view and 
struck down-as violating the First Amendment-the part of the statute and the 
part of the regulation demanding that issuers publicly identify products as not 
"DRC conflict free," a requirement that, in the majority's view, forced companies 
to publicly shoulder moral responsibility for atrocities in the Congo. 72 
The D.C. Circuit considered the challenged requirement under two different 
tests: (i) the test applicable to commercial speech, which can be compelled pro-
vided that (a) the government seeks to advance a substantial interest, and (b) the 
required speech directly advances that interest in a manner that could not be ac-
complished as well by a narrower intrusion on free expression; and (ii) the test 
applicable to factual and uncontroversial information about products and ser-
vices, which can be compelled if the required speech is reasonably related to 
the government's interest in protecting consumers from deceptive advertising. 73 
As to the first part of the first test, the D.C. Circuit majority found that the gov-
ernment interest behind the requirement that public companies identify certain 
products as not "DRC conflict free" was to "ameliorat[e] the humanitarian crisis 
in the DRC. "74 The majority treated this as "a sufficient interest of the United 
States."75 The requirement, however, could not pass the second part of the 
first test because the notion that the reporting requirement would reduce atroc-
ities in the Congo rested on "speculation or conjecture. "76 
67. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 
249b) 
68. Nat'! Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Nat1 Ass'n of Mfrs. I], 
overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en 
bane); see Case/aw Developments 2014, 70 Bus. LAw. 903, 911-16 (2015) [hereinafter 2014 Case/aw De-
velopments] (discussing Nat1 Ass'n of Mfrs. I). 
69. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. I, 748 F.3d at 370-73. 
70. Am Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 20; id. at 22-23 (repudiating Nat1Ass'n of Mfrs. I, 748 F.3d at 370-73). 
71. Nat'! Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 519-20 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Nat'l Ass'n of 
Mfrs. II]. 
72. Id. at 530. 
73. Id. at 519-30. The test for commercial speech derives from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v. 
Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). The test for disclosures designed to 
prevent deception of consumers derives from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court 
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
74. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d at 524 (quoting SEC brief). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 524-27 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)). 
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The D.C. Circuit majority held that the second test did not apply because the 
required disclosure was not related to advertising or protection of consumers. 77 
Moreover, even if the test did apply, the disclosure that particular products were 
not "DRC conflict free" was not limited to factual and uncontroversial informa-
tion. 78 Instead, it required companies to accept moral responsibility for wrong-
doing, even though that responsibility was a matter of significant disagreement. 79 
SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
The Eleventh Circuit held last year that a public relations firm was liable for 
aiding and abetting its client's fraud on brokers and investors and also that the 
firm violated the registration requirement by taking stock from the client in pay-
ment of fees and then reselling the stock to raise cash needed for operations.80 
Both the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissals of actions 
brought in federal court to enjoin, at their outset, SEC administrative enforce-
ment proceedings on the grounds that the proceedings allegedly violated consti-
tutional rights. 81 
Public relations company exposure for helping issuer increase investor interest. SEC v. 
Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc. demonstrates the dangers of providing public rela-
tions services to an issuer for the purpose of stimulating trading in the issuer's 
stock.82 Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc. ("Big Apple") and its subsidiaries sold 
public relations and investor relations services to small companies.83 As part of 
its work, Big Apple "operated a telephone call room that contacted registered se-
curities brokers and dealers to disseminate public information in order to create 
interest in client companies and their stock "84 One Big Apple subsidiary con-
tracted to provide services to CyberKey Solutions, Inc. ("CyberKey"), with the 
Big Apple subsidiary specifically committing to "diligently market and promote 
[CyberKey] to brokers and [ ] introduce [CyberKey] and its principals to 
[the Big Apple subsidiary's] current and future network of brokerage firms and 
market makers."85 CyberKey paid the Big Apple subsidiary with CyberKey 
stock, and the subsidiary purchased options on additional CyberKey shares.86 
This arrangement was typical for Big Apple, as ninety-five percent of its clients 
paid with stock.87 
77. Id. at 524 ("[W]e therefore hold that Zauderer has no application to this case."). 
78. Id. at 527-30; see id. at 524 ("Even if ... Zauderer governed the analysis, we still believe that 
the statute and the regulations violate the First Amendment."). 
79. Id. at 530. 
80. See infra notes 82-129 and accompanying text. 
81. See infra notes 130-62 and accompanying text. 
82. 783 F.3d 786 (11th Cir. 2015) 
83. Id. at 790. 
84. Id. at 791. 
85. Id. (quoting contract). Although CyberKey contracted with one Big Apple subsidiary, the par-
ties understood that Big Apple and its subsidiaries would provide the services. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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CyberKey falsely told Big Apple that CyberKey had valuable contracts with 
U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security 
("DHS").88 In late 2005, the CyberKey CEO gave a contract to Big Apple princi-
pals, claiming that it documented the transaction with DHS. 8 g While the Big 
Apple principals did not look at the contract closely, the contract showed obvi-
ous signs of fraud-with the counterparty identified in several places as the State 
of Connecticut, rather than DHS, and with the contract award date specified dif-
ferently on different pages of the document.go Nevertheless, Big Apple and a sub-
sidiary publicized the supposed DHS contract through press releases, some of 
which announced that CyberKey had shipped product to DHS and received 
two $4.2 million payments from that government agency.g1 
In January 2006, CyberKey provided a financial statement to one of the Big 
Apple principals showing only $6,000 in cash, despite CyberKey having suppo-
sedly received the first payment of $4.2 million from DHS, and CyberKey sub-
sequently failed to engage an outside auditor to review its financials, despite urg-
ing from the Big Apple principal to do so.g2 In the summer of 2006, a vice 
president of a Big Apple subsidiary prepared a memorandum that listed various 
"broken promises" by CyberKey.g3 In August 2006, a DHS official contacted a 
Big Apple subsidiary to say that he could not locate the purchase order referred 
to in a CyberKey press release.g4 The SEC eventually sued the CyberKey CEO, 
who was also indicted and convicted of securities fraud.gs 
Over the course of its relationship with CyberKey, Big Apple and one of its 
subsidiaries sold some 720 million shares of CyberKey stock for about $7.8 mil-
lion.g6 The Big Apple companies never disclosed to investors or brokers that Big 
Apple was being paid in CyberKey stock.g7 
The SEC sued Big Apple, two subsidiaries, and individuals associated with the Big 
Apple companies.gs The district court granted summary judgment to the SEC on 
claims that (i) Big Apple, a subsidiary, and an individual defendant violated section 
5 of the Securities Act; (ii) Big Apple and a subsidiary violated section lS(a) of the 
Exchange Act, which requires that brokers and dealers register with the SEC; and 
(iii) two individual defendants aided and abetted the violations of section lS(a).gg 
A jury then found that Big Apple, both subsidiary defendants, and the related indi-
viduals had violated section l 7(a) of the Securities Act and found that they also 
aided and abetted CyberKey's violations of Rule lOb-srno 




92. Id. at 793. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 794. 
96. Id. at 793-94. 
97. Id. at 792-93. 
98. Id. at 790, 794. 
99. Id. at 794. 
100. Id. 
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In affirming the resulting judgment, 101 the Eleventh Circuit provided four 
holdings worth noting here. First, the court rejected the defendants' argument 
that they "did not have ultimate authority over the content of CyberKey's 
press releases," so that, under ]anus, "they could not be considered 'makers' of 
any material misstatements and thus could not be liable under the provisions 
of § l 7(a), which they assert[ed] are 'largely coextensive in scope' to those of 
Rule lOb-5." 102 The court observed that section l 7(a)(2) "renders it 'unlawful 
for any person in the offer or sale of any securities ... to obtain money or prop-
erty by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a 
material fact,"' which, to the court, "'suggest[ed] ... it is irrelevant for purposes 
of liability whether the seller uses his own false statement or one made by another 
individual."' 103 Thus, the ]anus ruling104 on who "makes" a statement for purpose 
of Rule 1 Ob-5(b)-which prohibits the "mak[ing]" of untrue statements in connec-
tion with securities transactions-does not apply to section l 7(a)(2). 105 Further, 
subsections (a)(l) and (a)(3) of section 17 do not contain the word "make" and 
"are in no way directly or indirectly affected by the ]anus decision."106 
In its second noteworthy holding, the Eleventh Circuit addressed aiding and 
abetting. At the time of the violations, Exchange Act section 20(e) permitted the 
SEC to bring aiding and abetting claims against "any person who 'knowingly 
provides substantial assistance' to a primary violator of the Exchange Act." 107 
The Dodd-Frank Act amended the provision so that it now permits the SEC 
to bring such claims against "any person that knowingly or recklessly provides 
substantial assistance" to such a violator. 108 The defendants argued that, because 
their conduct took place before the amendment, the SEC had to prove that the 
defendants charged with aiding and abetting had "'actual knowledge' of Cyber-
Key's and [its CEO's] violations of§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5." 109 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit reviewed the history of section 20(e) and concluded that-before the Dodd-
Frank Act-the Eleventh Circuit and "[e]very other circuit to consider the issue . 
acknowledged that severe recklessness could suffice" for aiding and abetting liabil-
101. Id. at 814. 
102. Id. at 795. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012) ("obtain money or property by means of any 
untrue statement"), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015) (" ... make any untrue statement ... "). In Janus 
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011), the Court held that, "[f]or 
purposes of Rule 10b-5[(b)], the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority 
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it." 
103. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 796-97 (first quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added 
by the court); and then quoting SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 127 (1st Cir. 2008)). In the Tambone 
case, the First Circuit granted en bane review of the panel opinion and withdrew that opinion. See 
SEC v. Tambone, 573 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2009). Thereafter, the First Circuit, sitting en bane, reinstated 
the panel's analysis of section l 7(a)(2) of the Securities Act. See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 4 36, 450 
(1st Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
104. See supra note 102. 
105. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 797. 
106. Id. at 796; see id. at 797-98 (quotation from 798). 
107. Id. at 798 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000)). 
108. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 9290, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) 
(2012)) (emphasis added to show amendment). 
109. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 798. 
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ityuo Congress amended the statute to add the words "or recklessly" to codify 
those judicial holdings and to correct lower court decisions that held otherwise. 111 
Because recklessness therefore sufficed, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court's summary judgment against individual defendants for aiding and abetting 
Big Apple's failure to register as a broker/dealer, as the lower court had found 
that those defendants "were at least severely reckless in providing substantial assis-
tance to Big Apple's and [its subsidiary's] § lS(a) violations."112 The court of ap-
peals similarly held that the lower court properly instructed the jury "that it 
could find that the defendants acted 'knowingly' for purposes of§ 20(e) if the de-
fendants 'knew or were severely reckless in not knowing that [CyberKey's CEO] and 
CyberKey ... were fraudulently disseminating false statements that CyberKey had 
obtained a $25 million DHS contract."' 113 
The Eleventh Circuit's third significant holding approved a "deliberate igno-
rance" instruction that informed the jurors that they "may infer knowledge of 
the existence of a fact if a [d]efendant was aware of a high probability of the ex-
istence of that fact and purposely contrived to avoid learning [it]." 114 The in-
struction added that, "[i] f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
[d]efendant intentionally avoided knowledge or enlightenment, you may find 
that [ d] efendant acted knowingly or recklessly." 115 After noting that the Su-
preme Court has approved use of "deliberate ignorance" instructions in civil 
cases, 116 the court of appeals rejected a defense argument that the instruction 
improperly deviated from the Eleventh Circuit pattern instruction by failing to 
tell the jury that it could not find that a defendant was deliberately ignorant 
of a fact if the defendant "actually believed" that the fact did not exist. 117 The 
appellate court reasoned that the instruction's focus on intentionally avoiding 
knowledge was sufficient because "a defendant who did not actually believe 
there was fraud would not be 'intentionally avoid [ing] knowledge or enlighten-
ment' because he would have nothing to believe he was avoiding." 118 
Fourth and finally, the Big Apple decision affirmed the summary judgment 
against Big Apple, a subsidiary, and an individual for violating section 5 of the 
Securities Act, which prohibits the interstate sale of securities unless the sale oc-
curs pursuant to an effective registration statement or unless the sale is exempt 
from registration. 119 Conceding that the SEC proved its prima facie case by 
showing that Big Apple sold millions of shares of CyberKey stock in unregistered 
110. Id. at 800 (collecting cases). 
111. Id. at 799-801. 
112. Id. at 798 (quoting district court). 
113. Id. (quoting jury instruction) (emphasis added by appellate court). Moreover, the jury had 
expressly found that the defendants "acted both with actual knowledge and with severe recklessness." 
Id. at 801. 
114. Id. at 803 (quoting jury instruction) (first alteration by appellate court). 
115. Id. at 803-04 (quoting jury instruction) (second and third alterations by appellate court). 
116. Id. at 802-03 (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 
(2011)) 
117. Id. at 804-05 (quoting pattern jury instruction). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 806-10. 
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transactions, the defendants claimed that they had proved the sales fell within 
section 4(a)(l) of the Securities Act, which exempts "transactions by any person 
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 120 The Eleventh Circuit held that 
this exemption did not apply because the district court properly determined that 
the defendants were "underwriters" and that Big Apple and its subsidiary were 
"dealers." 121 
The Securities Act defines "underwriter" to include "any person who has pur-
chased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection 
with, the distribution of any security." 122 The definition focuses on "investment 
intent at the time of acquisition," with a rule of thumb "that a two-year holding 
period is sufficient to negate the inference that the security holder did not ac-
quire the securities with a 'view to distribute."' 123 While the defendants claimed 
they had held CyberKey stock for six months and "maybe even longer," that 
holding period fell short of the two years that would negate an inference of pur-
chase for distribution. 124 Moreover, evidence presented by the SEC showed ac-
quisitions and sales very close in time. 125 While the defendants argued that they 
took CyberKey stock in payment for services, the court found that fact to rein-
force the conclusion that they were underwriters, as it was "difficult to fathom 
how Big Apple could operate by receiving stock not with a 'view toward' distri-
bution in order to maintain its own operating costs." 126 
The Securities Act defines a "dealer" to include "any person who engages either 
for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, . . in the business of offering, 
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another 
person. "127 Big Apple and its subsidiaries fell comfortably into this definition 
as their "entire business model was predicated on the . . sale of securities" re-
ceived from clients in exchange for services provided by Big Apple. 128 
Significance and analysis. Beyond showing how tricky it is to stay on the right 
side of the law when providing public relations services to companies for the 
purpose of raising their profile with investors and brokers, Big Apple provides 
a rare decision on the statutory exemption provided by section 4(a)(l) of the Se-
curities Act. In doing so, the opinion demonstrates the continuing vitality of the 
120. Id. at 807 (quoting 15 USC. § 77d(a)(l) (2012)) 
121. Id. at 807-10. 
122. 15 USC.§ 77b(a)(ll) (2012) 
123. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 807 (citations omitted). 
124. Id. (quoting defendants). 
125. Id. at 808 (citing the acquisition-and, within one month, the sale-of 300 million shares 
and the acquisition-and, on the same day, the sale-of 6 million shares). 
126. Id. The defendants pointed to the six-month holding period in Rule 144. Id. at 809 (citing 17 
C.F.R. § 230.l 44(d) (2015)). The court, however, declined to read that holding period into the stat-
utory exemption provided by section 4(a)(l), as the defendants did not otherwise qualify for Rule 
144 protection. Id. 
127. 15 USC. § 77b(a)(l2) (2012) 
128. Big Apple, 783 F.3d at 809. 
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two-year holding period rule of thumb. 129 The decision also illustrates the prob-
lems facing any services provider-whether a public relations firm or law firm or 
other-that takes stock as compensation, where the sale of the stock is consis-
tently necessary to satisfy the service provider's cash flow needs. 
Timing of challenges to SEC choice to proceed by administrative enforcement. The 
SEC may bring an enforcement action either in federal district court or in an ad-
ministrative proceeding before one of the SEC's administrative law judges 
("ALJs")no Two circuit courts held, in 2015, that respondents in administrative 
proceedings could not challenge the SEC's decisions to proceed in that forum by 
suing in federal court before the administrative proceedings ran their course. 
In the first case, the Commission filed an administrative proceeding against 
George Jarkesy, Jr. and the investment advisory firm he headed, also naming 
as respondents a broker-dealer and another individual defendant-alleging vio-
lations of the Exchange Act, the Securities Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and 
the Investment Company Act. 131 After the broker-dealer and the other individ-
ual settled and the SEC issued an order that both approved that settlement and 
included "findings" that were not binding on Mr. Jarkesy or his advisory firm, 
but implicated them, Mr. Jarkesy and his advisory firm filed an action in federal 
court seeking an injunction to prevent the SEC from continuing with the admin-
istrative proceeding against them. 132 They alleged that the continuation of that 
proceeding would violate their (i) Fifth Amendment due process rights because 
the SEC had prejudged them by the findings it made in approving the settlement 
with the other respondents; (ii) equal protection rights because they were denied 
a right to a jury trial (which they would have had if the Commission had pro-
ceeded in federal court); and (iii) equal protection rights because the SEC pur-
sued them out of animus. 133 They also contended that the SEC administrative 
proceeding should be stopped because the Commission had (iv) violated the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("APA") by engaging in ex parte communications 
with the settling respondents; and (v) failed to provide discovery that the SEC 
was required by its own rules to produce. 134 
Affirming the district court's dismissal of the case 135 on the ground that the 
statutory scheme for administrative proceedings "implicitly precluded concur-
rent district-court jurisdiction over challenges like Jarkesy's," 136 the D.C. Circuit 
employed the analysis set out in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich. 137 This analysis 
required Mr. Jarkesy to "proceed exclusively through [the] statutory scheme of 
129. 1 LOUIS Loss ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECUR!TlES REGULATION 568 (6th ed. 2011) (tracing the 
two-year presumption back to comments made by SEC Commissioner Manuel F. Cohen in the 
1960s) 
130 15 USC. §§ 78u(d), 78u-2, 78u-3 (2012) 
131. jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 14. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 12, 30. 
136. Id. at 12. 
137. Id. at 15 (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994)). 
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administrative and judicial review when (i) [a congressional] intent [that the 
respondent do so] is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme,' and (ii) the lit-
igant's claims are 'of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within [the] stat-
utory structure."' 138 
Turning to the first prong of the analysis, the court of appeals found the req-
uisite intent because the securities statutes provided a "comprehensive structure 
for the adjudication of securities violations in administrative proceedings," in-
cluding Commission review of ALJ decisions followed by the opportunity to 
seek review of an adverse Commission decision in a federal court of appeals. 139 
By statute, Congress left the choice of forum to the SEC, and the Commission's 
right to make its choice "could be for naught if respondents like Jarkesy could 
countermand the Commission's choice by filing a court action." 140 
The appellate court then divided the second prong of the analysis into three 
factors: (i) whether the judicial review provided by statute to Mr. Jarkesy was 
"meaningful"; (ii) whether his attack through his federal court action was 
"wholly collateral" to his administrative proceeding; and (iii) whether his federal 
court claims were outside the SECs area of expertise. 141 As to the first factor, the 
court rejected Mr. Jarkesy's contention that judicial review was not meaningful 
because the SEC could not adjudicate constitutional challenges to the statutes 
that permitted the administrative proceeding, reasoning that his "constitutional 
claims ... can eventually reach 'an Article Ill court fully competent to adjudicate' 
them." 142 Nor was Mr. Jarkesy deprived of a meaningful review because he had 
to go through a costly administrative proceeding to get to a court of appeals 
because-unlike a litigant who had to break a law that he or she would not oth-
erwise break in order to generate a controversy to raise a constitutional question-
Mr. Jarkesy was "already properly before the Commission by virtue of his alleged 
violations."143 Moreover, the review was not without meaning because the ALJ had 
denied Mr. Jarkesy's requests for discovery to prove some of his claims, as an ap-
peals court could always remand the matter to the SEC for further factual devel-
opment, if necessary. 144 
As to the second factor, Mr. Jarkesy's claims were not "wholly collateral" to his 
administrative proceeding because several of them-such as that the Commis-
sion had (i) prejudged his case by making non-binding findings against him 
in the order settling with other respondents, (ii) violated the APA through ex 
parte communications with the other respondents during settlement with 
them, and (iii) failed to provide required discovery-were "inextricably inter-
twined with the conduct of the very enforcement proceeding the statute grants 
138. Id. (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 212) (last alteration by D.C. Circuit). 
139. Id. at 16-17. 
140. Id. at 17. 
141. Id. (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13). 
142. Id. at 19 (quoting Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2137 (2012)). 
14 3. Id. at 20. 
144. Id. at 22. 
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the SEC the power to institute and resolve as an initial matter." 145 The D.C. Cir-
cuit declined to parse the claims finely in order to create collateral issues because 
doing so would produce ambiguous analysis that "would encourage respondents 
in administrative enforcement proceedings to frame their challenges [in ways to 
conform to any 'collateral' issues a close analysis might conjure] ... and thereby 
earn access to another forum in which to advance their arguments." 146 
Turning to the third factor of the second prong of the Thunder Basin analysis, 
the court granted that the SEC might not have special expertise in certain of the 
constitutional issues Jarkesy raised, but found that the Commission was fully ca-
pable of addressing such matters as whether the settlement with the other re-
spondents prejudiced Mr. Jarkesy and his other attacks on the fairness of the 
proceeding. 147 Moreover, if the administrative proceeding resolved in Mr. Jarkesy's 
favor, the constitutional claims could be avoided, and even if not, the Commission 
might interpret the securities laws in such a way that would "answer or shed light 
on" those claims. 148 
Resolving both prongs of the Thunder Basin analysis against him, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held "that the securities laws provide an exclusive avenue for judicial review 
that Jarkesy may not bypass by filing suit in district court." 149 
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar result, albeit with a less rigorous anal-
ysis, in Bebo v. SEC. 150 The SEC brought an administrative enforcement proceed-
ing against Laurie Bebo, alleging that, while CEO, she had manipulated internal 
records at her company, lied to auditors, and made false disclosures to the Com-
mission.151 Before the ALJ entered an initial decision, Ms. Bebo sued in federal 
court, alleging that the provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that authorized the SEC 
to initiate administrative actions against persons who are not registered with the 
SEC in the securities business 152 is unconstitutional "because it provides the SEC 
'unguided' authority to choose which respondents will and which will not re-
ceive the procedural protections of a federal district court, in violation of 
equal protection and due process guarantees." 153 She also argued that, because 
the ALJs presiding in the administrative proceedings are insulated from removal 
by the president "by multiple layers of for-cause protection," the proceedings 
"interfere[] with the President's [Article II] obligation to ensure the faithful exe-
cution of the laws."154 As in]arhesy, the district court dismissed the federal court 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. 155 
145. Id. at 23 (quoting jarkesy v. SEC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2014)). 
146. Id. at 25. 
147. Id. at 28. 
148. Id. at 29. 
149. Id. at 30. 
150. 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2016) (No. 15-997). 
151. Id. at 767. 
152. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862-64 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-2 (2012)) 
153. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 768, 775. 
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The Seventh Circuit, however, keyed its analysis to Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub-
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board, 156 which the court found to focus on the 
three factors in the second prong of the Thunder Basin analysis. 157 The court held 
that the question of whether Ms. Bebo had available "meaningful judicial review" 
was the "most critical," and that Ms. Bebo had such review because, as she was 
"already the respondent in a pending enforcement proceeding," she could, 
"[a] fter the pending enforcement action has run its course, . raise her objec-
tions in a circuit court of appeals established under Article Ill." 158 Being already 
embroiled in an enforcement proceeding involuntarily, she did "not need to risk 
incurring a sanction voluntarily just to bring her constitutional challenges before 
a court of competent jurisdiction." 159 With this "most important" factor weigh-
ing against her, it did not matter whether her constitutional claims were "wholly 
collateral" to her administrative proceeding or not, 160 and jurisdiction did "not 
turn on whether the SEC has authority to hold [the relevant section of the Dodd-
Frank Act] unconstitutional, nor [did] it hinge on whether Bebo's constitutional 
challenges fall outside the agency's expertise." 161 
Echoing the concern voiced by the D.C. Circuit, the Seventh Circuit worried that 
a contrary holding would mean that "[e]very person hoping to enjoin an ongoing 
administrative proceeding could make [Ms. Bebo's] argument," and returned, at the 
end of the opinion to the first Thunder Basin prong, saying that it found "no evi-
dence from the statute's text, structure, and purpose that Congress intended for 
plaintiffs like Bebo who are already subject to ongoing administrative enforcement 
proceedings to be able to stop those proceedings by challenging the constitution-
ality of the enabling legislation or the structural authority of the SEC. "162 
PROXY SOLICITATION 
Ordinary business exception to shareholder's right to use company proxy for share-
holder resolution. Exchange Act Rule l 4a-8 provides that a registered shareholder 
of a public company-who has continuously held at least $2,000 worth, or at 
least one percent, of the company's voting securities for at least one year-can 
submit a proposal to be considered at the company's annual meeting of share-
holders and further provides that the "company must include [that] proposal 
156. Id. at 768-69 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 
(2010)) 
157. Id. at 769. The court of appeals also relied on Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 
2126, 2135-36, 2140 (2012), for the rule that a facial constitutional challenge to an administrative 
hearing scheme does not automatically entitle a respondent in an administrative proceeding to "seek 
judicial review in ... district court," Bebo, 799 F.3d at 771, and the rule "that jurisdiction does not 
turn on whether the SEC has authority to hold§ 929P(a) of Dodd-Frank unconstitutional," id. at 773. 
158. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 774. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 772-73 (citing Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2140). 
162. Id. at 775. In one other noteworthy decision, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the SEC that the 
requirement for the Division of Enforcement to file a proceeding within 180 days of serving a Wells 
notice is not jurisdictional, and therefore the violation of that time limit does not require dismissal of 
the late-filed proceeding. Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 81-83 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the 
company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders." 163 The company's 
proxy statement must also include the shareholder's argument in support of 
the proposal, but the proposal itself and the supporting argument cannot exceed 
500 words. 164 
The company, however, can exclude a proposal from its proxy materials if any 
of a number of exceptions apply. 165 One exception permits the company to ex-
clude a shareholder's proposal from its proxy materials if "the proposal deals 
with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations" 166 (the 
"Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion"). Another exception permits the com-
pany to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials if the "proposal or support-
ing statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules." 167 Proposals 
can be excluded on this ground when they "are 'so vague and ambiguous that the 
issuer and security holders would not be able to determine what action the pro-
posal is contemplating"' 168 (the "Vague and Ambiguous Exclusion"). 
Trinity Wall Street ("Trinity"), an Episcopal parish, submitted a proposal to 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") for inclusion in Wal-Mart's proxy materials 
for its 2014 annual shareholder meeting. 169 Trinity's proposal requested that 
the directors amend the charter of the board's Compensation, Nominating and 
Governance Committee to add to its duties: 
Providing oversight concerning [and the public reporting of1 the formulation and 
implementation of . . policies and standards that determine whether or not the 
Company should sell a product that: 
1) especially endangers public safety and well-being; 
2) has the substantial potential to impair the reputation of the Company; and/or 
3) would reasonably be considered by many offensive to the family and community 
values integral to the Company's promotion of its brand. 170 
Trinity's supporting statement said that the oversight would include "policies 
and standards that would be applicable to [(i)] determining whether or not 
the company should sell guns equipped with magazines holding more than 
ten rounds of ammunition, and [(ii)] balancing the benefits of selling 
such guns against the risks that these sales pose to the public and to the Com-
pany's reputation and brand value." 171 
163. 17 CFR. § 240.14a-8 (2015) 
164. Id. § 240 l 4a-8(d) 
165. Id.§ 240.14a-8(i) (listing thirteen bases for exclusion). 
166. Id. § 240 l 4a-8(i)(7) 
167. Id. § 240 l 4a-8(i)(3) 
168. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 355 (3d Cir. 2015) (Shwartz,]., con-
curring) (quoting Proposed Amendments to Rule l 4a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 1982 WL 
600869, at *13 (Oct. 14, 1982)). 
169. Id. at 328 (majority opinion). judge Ambro authored the opinion of the court, and was joined 
by judge Vanaskie. Id. at 326. 
170. Id. at 329-30 (quoting proposal) (alteration by court). 
171. Id. at 330 (quoting proposal). 
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In January 2014, Wal-Mart informed Trinity and the SECs Division of Corpo-
rate Finance that Wal-Mart believed that the proposal fell within the Ordinary 
Business Operations Exclusion. 172 In March 2014, the SEC staff issued a "no-
action" letter to Wal-Mart, stating that the staff would not recommend an enforce-
ment action against the company if it excluded Trinity's proposal from its proxy 
materials. 173 Trinity sued in federal court for a declaration that Wal-Mart's deci-
sion to exclude the proposal violated Rule l 4a-8, seeking both a preliminary and 
permanent injunction to prevent Wal-Mart from excluding the proposal. 174 The 
district court denied the preliminary injunction on the basis that the Ordinary 
Business Operations Exclusion applied. 175 However, because the district court 
concluded that the case was not moot after the 2014 shareholder meeting be-
cause the complaint reasonably anticipated a 2015 violation, 176 the lower 
court proceeded with the case and ruled on summary judgment in Trinity's 
favor, concluding that the Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion did not 
apply.177 
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, 178 with (i) an opinion of the 
court, authored by two judges, who concluded-on an elaborate analysis-
that the Ordinary Business Operations Exemption applied, 179 and (ii) a concur-
ring opinion by the third judge, who (a) also concluded-but on a more trun-
cated analysis-that the Ordinary Business Operations Exemption applied, 180 
and (b) further concluded, joined by a member of the majority, that the 
Vague and Ambiguous Exclusion applied. 181 The majority found that the "sub-
ject matter" of Trinity's proposal was not corporate governance through board 
oversight of strategic matters, such as community responsibility and reputation, 
but that "[t]he subject matter of the proposal [was] instead its ultimate conse-
quence-here a potential change in the way Wal-Mart decides which products 
to sell." 182 That subject matter was "at the core of Wal-Mart's business" because 
"[a] retailer's approach to its product offerings is the bread and butter of its busi-
ness." 183 Thus, the proposal "relate [ d]" to Wal-Mart's ordinary business. 184 
The majority, however, recognized that the SEC staff takes the view that the 
Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion generally does not apply if "a proposal's 
underlying subject matter transcends the day-to-day business matters of the 
company and raises policy issues so significant that it would be appropriate 
172. Id. at 330-31. 
173. Id. at 331. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 332. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 328. 
179. Id. at 340-51. 
180. Id. at 351-54 (Shwartz, ]., concurring). 
181. Id. at 355. judge Vanaskie joined this part of the concurrence. See id. at 351, 355. 
182. Id. at 342 (majority opinion). 
183. Id. at 344. 
184. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 240. l 4a-8(i)(7) (2015) (stating that shareholder proposal may be excluded 
if it "deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations" (emphasis added)). 
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for a shareholder vote."185 The majority conceded that the Trinity proposal "raise[d] 
a matter of sufficiently significant policy." 186 The policy, however, did not tran-
scend Wal-Mart's ordinary business operations because "the essence of a retail-
er's business is deciding what products to put on its shelves-decisions made 
daily that involve a careful balancing of financial, marketing, reputational, com-
petitive and other factors." 187 Pointing to a series of no-action letters in which 
the SEC staff concluded that the Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion ap-
plied to shareholder proposals designed to force retailers to stop selling or pro-
moting products that "pose a threat to public health," the majority found that 
Trinity's proposal "targets the same basic business decision: how to weigh safety 
risks in the merchandising calculus." 188 The majority further found that "Wal-
Mart's consideration of the risk that certain products pose to its 'economic suc-
cess' and 'reputation for good corporate citizenship' is enmeshed with the way it 
runs its business and the retailer-consumer interaction." 189 In short, "[f] or a pol-
icy issue here to transcend Wal-Mart's business operations, it must target some-
thing more than the choosing of one among tens of thousands of products it 
sells," and Trinity's proposal "fail[ed] that test." 190 
The concurring judge (alone) thought that this analysis went too far and 
"practically gives companies carte blanche to exclude any proposal raising social 
policy issues that are directly related to core business operations." 191 She con-
cluded, however, that the first component of Trinity's proposal-which was 
not phrased specifically in terms of high-capacity weapons, but instead referred 
broadly to "public safety," implicating "thousands of goods"-was not suffi-
ciently focused to raise a "significant social policy." 192 The second and third 
components of Trinity's proposal-which related to potential harm to Wal-
Mart's reputation and whether its products might offend family and community 
values-could also "cover many products" and, in addition, were matters of con-
cern to the company and its shareholders but did "not present a social policy 
issue." 193 
The concurring judge (joined by one member of the majority) also found that 
Wal-Mart could exclude Trinity's proposal from its proxy materials because the 
Vague and Ambiguous Exclusion applied. 194 Focusing on the third set of poli-
cies Trinity demanded-regarding "the sale of products that 'would reasonably 
be considered by many to be offensive to the family and community values in-
185. Trinity Wall St., 792 F.3d at 345 (quoting SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E, 2009 WL 
4363205, at *2 (Oct. 27, 2009)). 
186. Id. at 346. 
187. Id. at 348. 
188. Id. at 348-50. 
189. Id. at 350. The majority observed that the outcome might have been different if such a pro-
posal had been submitted to a company that manufactured a very narrow range of products, unlike 
retailers that "typically deal with thousands of products amid many options for each." Id. at 349. 
190. Id. at 351. 
191. Id. at 353 (Shwartz,]., concurring). 
192. Id. at 354. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 355. judge Vanaskie joined this part of the concurrence. See id. at 351, 355. 
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tegral to' Wal-Mart's brand"-the concurrence found that "th[o]se buzz words 
fail[ed] to provide any concrete guidance as to what constitutes 'many' or 
what 'family values' should be considered." 195 Accordingly, the proposal did 
"not inform the shareholders of the breadth of the subject on which they 
would be asked to vote nor [did] it make clear what the Company would be re-
quired to do if it were adopted." 196 
FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS 
Federal securities law defines forward-looking statements to include financial 
projections and forecasts of future economic performance, management's plans 
and objectives for future operations, and related or underlying assumptions. 197 
With important exceptions not relevant to decisions discussed below, both the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act provide two protections, from liability in 
private lawsuits, for forward-looking statements made by issuers filing reports 
pursuant to Exchange Act sections 13(a) or lS(d), and the officers and other 
agents of those issuers. 198 First, to establish liability, a plaintiff must prove 
that a forward-looking statement was made with "actual knowledge that 
[it] was false or misleading." 199 Second, if an issuer accompanies a forward-
looking statement with "meaningful cautionary [language] identifying important 
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-
looking statement," then neither the issuer nor anyone acting on its behalf can be 
liable on the statement in a private action at all.20° Cautionary language accompa-
nies an oral forward-looking statement for this purpose if the oral statement refers 
to "a readily available written document" that contains the warnings, with SEC fil-
ings being "readily available" for this purpose. 201 
Two decisions interpreted these protections in 2015. The D.C. Circuit held 
that cautions accompanying forward-looking statements about inventory were 
not meaningful where they did not disclose that the issuer was holding obsolete 
inventory that would be hard to sell without heavy discounting. 202 The Eighth 
Circuit held that an issuer's statements regarding government-protected product 
exclusivity were forward-looking even though phrased in the present tense and 
that the accompanying cautions were meaningful, in a case where the govern-
ment ultimately exercised its discretion against enforcing the exclusivity. 203 
195. Id. (quoting proposal). 
196. Id. In another notable section l 4(a) case, the Sixth Circuit found that communications by a fired 
CEO to shareholders that effectively urged shareholders to revoke proxies given to management-but 
that did not ask shareholders to give proxies to the CEO-were exempt from the SEC rules requiring 
that proxy solicitations be filed with the SEC and include the content that SEC rules prescribe. Gas 
Nat. Inc. v. Osborne, 624 F. App'x 944, 952-55 (6th Cir. 2015). 
197. 15 USC§§ 77z-2(i)(l), 78u-5(i)(l) (2012) 
198. Id. §§ 77z-2(a)-(c), 78u-5(a)-(c) 
199. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(l)(B), 78u-5(c)(l)(B) 
200. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(l)(A), 78u-5(c)(l)(A) 
201. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(2)-(3), 78u-5(c)(2)-(3)(B) 
202. See infra notes 204-29 and accompanying text. 
203. See infra notes 230-50 and accompanying text. 
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Forward-looking statements, about growth and expansion and planned reduction in 
product inventory, made without disclosing that the inventory was obsolete. By the time 
In re Harman International Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation reached the D.C. Cir-
cuit, only three statements remained in the Rule lOb-5 action that the plaintiffs 
brought against the issuer defendant and three officers,204 with two of those 
statements treated as "forward-looking statements" for purpose of the appeal. 205 
The issuer manufactured a variety of products, including personal navigation de-
vices ("PNDs"). 206 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed fraud by 
making the two forward-looking statements without also telling investors that the 
company was stuck with a large inventory of obsolete PNDs that could not be 
sold except at low prices. 207 In the first statement, the CEO, on April 26, 2007, 
reminded listeners that the company had said three months earlier that "PND in-
ventories in Europe had grown substantially"; noted that the company had, at that 
time, said that it "planned to reduce [inventory] to normal levels at year-end"; 
added that this "plan is proceeding"; projected sales of 618,000 PND units 
by the end of the year; and forecasted reductions of inventory from $75 million 
at the end of March to $50 million by the end of April, $30 million at the end 
of May, and $15 million by the end of June.208 In the second statement, the 
chief financial officer ("CFO"), on September 27, 2007, predicted "a very strong 
first quarter [for Fiscal Year ('FY') 2008], ... reflecting ... [in part] the PND busi-
ness, where we continue the growth and expansion of that business primarily in 
Europe."209 
Before addressing whether the cautionary language accompanying those state-
ments shielded the defendants from liability, the D.C. Circuit defined "mean-
ingful" cautions-for purposes of the forward-looking statutory protection-to 
be "'substantive company-specific warnings based on a realistic description of 
the risks applicable to the particular circumstances'" that are "tailored to the 
forward-looking statement that it accompanies."210 The court held that cautions 
"cannot be 'meaningful' if [they are] 'misleading in light of historical fact[s] ."'211 
Although the cautions need not mention the particular risk that later matures 
and frustrates realization of the forward-looking statement, "Congress required 
that a company must warn of factors that '[h]av[e] much import or significance' 
and 'carry[] with [them] great or serious consequences,' and which are 'likely to 
204. 791 F.3d 90, 94-96 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3307 (U.S. Feb. 29, 2016) 
(No 15-694) 
205. The plaintiffs asserted on appeal that those statements did not fit within the statutory defi-
nition of "forward-looking statements," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-S(i)(l), but the court of appeals ruled the 
plaintiffs had forfeited that contention. Harman, 791 F.3d at 100. 
206. Harman, 791 F.3d at 95. 
207. Id. at 97-98. 
208. Id. at 96-97 (quoting CEO's statements to analysts). 
209. Id. at 98 (quoting CFO's statements to analysts). 
210. Id. at 102 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th 
Cir. 2004)) 
211. Id. (quoting Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 770 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
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have a profound effect on success."'212 "[M]ere boilerplate ... does not meet the 
statutory standard because by its nature it is general and ubiquitous, not tailored 
to the specific circumstances of a business operation,"213 and language that 
"remain[s] unchanged despite a significant change in circumstances of material 
importance to an investor" will not do. 214 
Armed with these principles, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's dis-
missal, which rested on the determination that Harman's cautionary language in-
sulated the two forward-looking statements from a private Rule lOb-5 claimns 
Turning to the first statement, made in a conference call on April 26, 2007, the 
defendants argued that cautions in the company's Annual Report on Form 10-K 
("10-K") for the fiscal year 2006-to which the moderator of the conference call 
referred listeners-said that "PND 'inventories ... had grown substantially,' in-
creasing to approximately $50 million."216 In addition, the 10-K "stated sales 
could suffer if the Company failed to 'develop, introduce and achieve market ac-
ceptance of new and enhanced products,' that it had to 'maintain and improve 
existing products, while successfully developing and introducing new products,' 
and could 'experience difficulties that delay or prevent the development, intro-
duction or market acceptance of new or enhanced products,' as well as that com-
petitors could 'introduce superior designs or business strategies, impairing [the 
Company's] distinctive image and [its] products' desirability."'217 Those warn-
ings, however, were not "meaningful" (at least when reviewed on a motion to 
dismiss) "because they were misleading in light of historical fact"-i.e., "they 
did not warn of actual obsolescence that had already manifested itself,"218 and 
that would make the amassed inventory hard to sell. The plaintiffs successfully 
pled that manifestation by alleging that (i) Harman had modified the PND design 
in early 2007, making its older versions obsolete; (ii) the company had missed its 
2006 PND sales target and was storing units in a warehouse; and (iii) the sales 
team had discussed price reductions in order to remain competitiven9 
The defendants pointed to the general rule that a company does not need to 
disclose what investors already know-here that technical devices obsolesce as 
new, more advanced products arrive on the market. 220 The court brushed this 
argument aside for the same reason it rejected the cautionary statements in-
cluded in the 10-K; the general principle did not mean that investors knew, at 
the time of the first statement, that Harman's PND inventory was already obso-
212. Id. at 103 (quoting, in the first and second instances, 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 728 (2d 
ed. 1989); then quoting NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 849 (2d ed. 2005) (citations omitted)). 
213. Id. at 102. 
214. Id. at 107. 
215. Id. at 95, 112. 
216. Id. at 104 (quoting 10-K). Harman's fiscal year ended on June 30, so the pertinent 10-K was 
filed in September 2006. See Harman Int'! Indus., Inc., 10-K (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/800459/000080045906000077/0000800459-06-000077-index.htm. 
217. Harman, 791 F.3d at 103-04 (quoting 10-K) (alteration by court). 
218. Id. at 104. 
219. Id. 
220 Id. 
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leten 1 As to the first statement's reference to a "plan" to reduce inventory by 
selling 618,000 PND units by the end of the year, that was "not a warning at 
all, much less of obsolescence. "222 
Moving to the second forward-looking statement, on September 27, 2007, the 
court reached the same conclusionn3 The cautionary statements on which defen-
dants relied to protect that statement appeared in the company's "FY 2007 [10-K], 
which repeated the general warnings in the FY 2006 [10-K]."224 By September 27, 
plaintiffs alleged, (i) Harman had agreed in June to sell 100,000 PNDs for $240 
per unit, not the ordinary price of $350; (ii) the company had missed its FY 2007 
projected PND sales by more than 200,000 units; and (iii), as told by an account-
ing manager, "had on hand hundreds of millions of dollars worth of obsolete 
Generation 2 PNDs which were being superseded by newer Generation 3 
PNDs in August 2007."225 In the face of those pled facts, the court found that 
warnings of "a generalized risk of obsolescence and the general effect that obso-
lescence could have on sales" were not "meaningful" but instead "misleading in 
light of historical facts," because, by the time of the second statement, "there 
was no longer a mere risk and some evidence of obsolescence, but rather an in-
tractable problem of obsolescence was a reality that the Company failed to 
disclose."226 
Significance and analysis. Harman suggests that, in order to obtain the protec-
tion in a case where the cautionary language does not address the particular fac-
tor that ultimately causes results to differ materially from those predicted in the 
forward-looking statement, the cautionary language must warn of "factors that 
'[h]av[e] much import or significance' and 'carry[] with [them] great or serious 
consequences,' and which are 'likely to have a profound effect on success."'227 
Unfortunately, this definition of "meaningful" is so general as to provide virtually 
no operational guidance. Harris v. Ivax Corporation, which Harman cites and 
quotes, offers a more useful formulation, saying that warnings are sufficient, 
even if they do not mention the particular risk that matured, if the cautions 
"warned of risks of a significance similar to that actually realized. "228 Harman 
may be best understood as addressing only the particular instance in which cau-
tionary language points to the very risk that frustrates the forward-looking state-
ment but the language is not "meaningful" because, at the time the defendants 
make the statement, the risk has already materialized and the defendants do not 
so disclose.229 
Forward-looking statements that federal agency would bring enforcement actions to 
protect exclusivity of drug. K-V Pharmaceutical Company ("K-V") bought the 
221. Id. at 105. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 106-08. 
224. Id. at 106. 
225. Id. at 106-07 (quoting complaint). 
226. Id. at 107. 
227. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
228. 182 F.3d 799, 807 (11th Cir. 1999), quoted in Harman, 791 F.3d at 103. 
229. Harman, 791 F.3d at 108. 
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rights to a drug to reduce pre-term labor in at-risk mothers. 23° K-V sought from 
the FDA, and obtained, an exclusive right to sell the drug for seven years, under 
the Orphan Drug Act, which is designed to stimulate the development and pro-
duction of drugs to treat conditions affecting less than 200,000 persons in the 
United States. 231 K-V stated in a conference call with investors on February 14, 
2011, that (i) the FDA had granted the medication orphan drug status; (ii) K-V 
planned to charge $1,500 per injection; (iii) insurers would pay for the drug be-
cause the cost of pre-term birth ($51,000) exceeded the total price for injections 
during a pregnancy ($30,000); and (iv) K-V would offer financial assistance to pa-
tients with household incomes up to $100,000.232 
The K-V price marked a 14 ,900 percent increase from the price of the drug 
when mixed by compounding pharmacies. 233 As to FDA action to enforce 
K-V's exclusive right, the company stated during the February 14, 2011, confer-
ence call its belief "that the regulations and laws are very clear that com-
pounding pharmacies are not FDA-approved manufacturing facilities and that 
FDA regulations and state pharmacy laws generally prohibit the distribution of 
compounded products that are the same or essentially the same as FDA-
approved products."234 The company added its belief "that compounded phar-
macies are aware of these laws and regulations, and our expectation is that they 
will adhere to them."235 
On February 1 7, 2011, K-V sent letters to compounding pharmacies advising 
them that they should not concoct the drug and warning them that that FDA en-
forcement action could follow if a compounding pharmacy produced the drug in 
an unlicensed way. 236 On March 30, 2011, however, the FDA issued a statement 
saying that, "[i]n order to support access to this important drug . [the agency 
did] not intend to take enforcement action against pharmacies that compound 
[the chemical equivalent of the drug]. "237 In response, K-V announced that it 
would reduce the price of the drug to $690 per injection.238 
The price of K-V stock dropped,239 and the plaintiffs filed a Rule lOb-5 action 
against K-V and three officers. 240 The Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court 
judgment dismissing the case. 241 The court of appeals held that the challenged 
230. julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791F.3d915, 917 (8th Cir. 2015). 
231. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee). 
232. Id. at 918. 
233. Id. "Compounding" is "a practice in which a licensed pharmacist, a licensed physician, or, in 
the case of an outsourcing facility, a person under the supervision of a licensed pharmacist, com-
bines, mixes, or alters ingredients of a drug to create a medication tailored to the needs of an indi-
vidual patient." Compounding and the FDA- Questions and Answers, U.S. FoOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// 
www. f da. gov /Dru gs/Guidance Compliance Regulatory Inf or ma tion/Pha rmacy Compounding/ 
ucm339764.htm#what (last updated Oct. 6, 2015). 
234. K-V, 791 F.3d at 918 (quoting company comments during call). 
235. Id. (quoting company comments during call). 
236. Id. at 919. 
237. Id. (quoting FDA's statement). 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 916-17, 920 (expressly referring to Rule lOb-5). 
241. Id. at 917, 920, 922, 923. 
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representations fell within the portion of the statutory definition of forward-
looking statements that provides protection to any "statement of the plans and 
objectives of management for future operations, including plans or objectives re-
lating to the products or services of the issuer"242 because the statements "de-
tailed K-V's future launch of [the drug] and the anticipated results."243 Even 
though the statements-"that K-V felt the laws and regulations were clear and 
that they anticipated that the FDA would enforce exclusivity once [the drug] 
was launched"-were phrased in "the present tense," the use of the present 
tense did "not undermine [the court's] determination that they were forward-
looking" because the statements were "tied to a future event[,] the launch of 
[the drug]" and "[u]ntil th[at] future event occurred, it could not be determined 
whether the FDA would vary from its usual practice of enforcing exclusivity."244 
The court thereby applied the principle that a statement in the present tense is 
forward-looking if its "veracity ... [can] only be determined after [it is] made."245 
Having ruled that K-V's statements fell within the statutory definition of "for-
ward looking," the Eighth Circuit went on to hold that the statute precluded a pri-
vate Rule 1Ob-5 action on the statements because the company had accompanied 
them with meaningful cautionary language. 246 The company had commenced the 
February 14, 2011, conference call by saying that actual results could differ ma-
terially from those suggested by forward-looking statements made during the 
call and that the uncertainties that might work this unhappy result included 
those that K-V had identified as risk factors in its 10-K.247 This was sufficient 
under the Exchange Act to "accompany" the oral forward-looking statements in 
the call by the cautionary language included in those risk factors. 248 In turn, 
those risk factors advised that "any product launch may be delayed or unsuccess-
ful, including with respect to Gestiva [the drug that was the subject of the case]"; 
and warned of "the possibility that any period of exclusivity may not be realized, 
including with respect to Gestiva, a designated Orphan Drug."249 The Eighth Cir-
cuit found these cautions "meaningful" because, far from being "boilerplate," they 
"warned [investors] of precisely the risks about which [the plaintiffs] now com-
plain" by "explicitly identif[ying] the risks associated with the FDA's presumed en-
242. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(l)(B) (2012). The statute also defines "forward-looking statement" to 
include "any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement" of management's 
plans and objectives. Id. § 78u-5(i)(l)(D). The court said that K-V's words "may also fairly be cate-
gorized as the underlying assumptions that are recognized as part of the protected forward-looking 
statements." K-V, 791 F.3d at 921. 
243. K-V, 791 F.3d at 921. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 922. 
247. Id.at917-18. 
248. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
249. K-V, 791 F.3d at 918 (quoting 10-K). The warnings in the 10-K referred to the drug as 
"Gestiva," but K-V later rebranded the drug as "Makena." Id. at 917. 
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forcement of exclusivity," tying this risk to the orphan-drug status of the very med-
icine that underlay the lawsuit. 250 
INSIDER TRADING 
In 2014, the Second Circuit held, in United States v. Newman, that a tipper vi-
olates Rule lOb-5 only if he or she receives a personal benefit from the tip and 
that benefit is "of some consequence. "251 The Second Circuit added that, while 
an inference of such benefit might be based on a personal relationship between 
the tipper and a tippee, "such an inference is impermissible in the absence of 
proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange 
that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pe-
cuniary or similarly valuable nature. "252 The court added that this "standard, al-
though permissive, does not suggest that the Government may prove the receipt 
of a personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or 
social nature," and that it would not be enough "that two individuals were 
alumni of the same school or attended the same church. "253 The Second Circuit 
held, as well, that a remote tippee-in order to violate Rule lOb-5-must know 
that the original tipper breached his or her duty in providing the tip which, in 
turn, means that the remote tippee must know that the original tipper received a 
personal benefit "of some consequence" from conveying the material nonpublic 
information. 254 
The Ninth Circuit wrestled with Newman last year in United States v. Sal-
man.255 In Salman, the defendant traded on inside information that (i) he re-
ceived from Michael Kara, who became the defendant's brother-in-law, and 
(ii) Michael Kara, in turn, received from Maher Kara, who was Michael's younger 
brother, who worked as an investment banker at Citigroup, and who was en-
gaged to, and married, the defendant's sister. 256 On appeal of his conviction 
for insider trading as a remote tippee under Rule lOb-5, 257 the defendant con-
tended there was insufficient evidence at trial to show either that the original tip-
per (Maher) received an adequate personal benefit or that, even if so, the defen-
dant knew of such benefit. 258 
250. Id. at 922. Another opinion on forward-looking statements, Pension Fund Group v. Tempur-
Pedic International, Inc., 614 F. App'x 237, 244 (6th Cir. 2015), held that cautionary language was 
sufficient to invoke the statutory protections, where the warnings referred to products introduced 
by competitors but did not include the issuer's internal analysis of the particular competitive threat 
posed by one of those products. 
251. 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 442-43, 447-54. 
255. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-
628) 
256. Id. at 1088-89. 
257. Id. at 1088, 1090. 
258. Id. at 1091. 
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Affirming the conviction,259 the Ninth Circuit disagreed with Newman to the 
extent that the Second Circuit's holding could be read to require that the benefit 
to the tipper be "tangible."260 Harkening back to the Supreme Court's words in 
Dirhs v. SEC that "a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend" 
might provide a sufficient benefit261 and Newman's statement that a personal 
benefit could include "the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift 
of confidential information to a trading relative or friend,"262 the Ninth Circuit 
held that the evidence that Maher intended the inside information as a gift to 
Michael supplied the necessary benefit to Maher and that, "while [the defendant] 
may not have been aware of all the details of the Kara brothers' relationship, the 
jury could easily have found that, as a close friend and member (through mar-
riage) of the close-knit Kara clan, [the defendant] must have known that, when 
Maher gave confidential information to Michael, he did so with the 'intention to 
benefit' a close relative. "263 
Significance and analysis. The critical passage from Dirhs reads, in full: 
[T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. This 
requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a di-
rect or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings. There are objective facts 
and circumstances that often justify such an inference. For example, there may be a 
relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from 
the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fidu-
ciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider 
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip 
and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits 
to the recipient. 264 
By its reference to "a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such 
as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earning,"265 
the passage implies an exchange of value for value. This suggests that psychic 
satisfaction should not, without more, suffice. Otherwise, virtually any tip 
would clear the personal benefit hurdle because there must be some reason, at 
least a psychological reason, motivating any tipper to tip. If that is so, the per-
sonal benefit element is so easily conjured as to constitute no element at all. 
The Ninth Circuit did not need to imply that no "tangible" benefit was needed, 
as evidence in the case supported an inference that Maher was, indeed, effec-
tively exchanging the material nonpublic information for value. 266 Perhaps the 
259. Id. at 1094. 
260. Id. at 1093. 
261. Id. (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)). 
262. Id. at 1093-94 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015)). 
263. Id. at 1094. 
264. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (citation omitted). 
265. Id. (emphasis added). 
266. Salman, 792 F .3d at 1089 ("Michael helped pay for Maher's college [and,] on one occasion, 
[Maher] received a call from Michael asking for a 'favor,' requesting 'information,' and explaining that 
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Ninth Circuit will revisit this issue and clarify Salman, by relying on the evidence 
of such value and expressly rejecting the notion that emotional satisfaction is 
enough to provide any needed benefit to an original tipper. 
MATERIALITY 
A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would consider the fact important in deciding whether to buy or sell a security, 
because the fact significantly alters the total mix of information that is available 
and relevant to that buy/sell decision. 267 Language that expresses general opti-
mism or a favorable characterization of facts, but that would not be important 
to a reasonable investor, is immaterial "puffery. "268 The D. C. Circuit applied 
that principle in 2015. 269 The Second Circuit did as well, while also considering 
both whether an asserted financial error was material even though it constituted 
a small percentage of the relevant company-wide number and whether there was 
a material difference between a bank saying that a regulator had "encouraged" 
the bank to raise capital instead of saying that the regulator had "required" the 
bank to do sono The First Circuit related materiality to scienter, finding insuf-
ficient evidence of scienter where the materiality of the misrepresentation was 
marginal. 271 Both that court and the Second Circuit rendered decisions that per-
mitted defense challenges to materiality in the face of testimony by financial in-
dustry participants that misrepresentations were important to them. 272 
Puffery. In re Harman International Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation held, in 
reversing a district court dismissal of a Rule lOb-5 complaint, that the defen-
dants' statement in an annual report-that "[s]ales of aftermarket products, par-
ticularly PNDs, were very strong during fiscal 2007"-was not puffery but 
instead an actionable statement.273 Centrally, the plaintiffs alleged the defen-
dants concealed during the class period that Harman had a large and growing 
inventory of obsolete PNDs that the company could only sell at steep dis-
counts.274 In discussing the materiality of the "very strong [sales]" statement, 
the court noted plaintiffs' allegations that (i) PNDs were sold by the company's 
automotive division, which brought in 70% of Harman's business and the bulk 
he 'owe[d] somebody.' After Michael turned down Maher's offer of money, Maher gave him a tip 
about an upcoming acquisition instead." (quoting trial testimony)). 
267. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988). 
268. See In re Apple Comput., Inc., 127 F. App'x 296, 304 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We have held the 
following ... statements to be non-actionable puffery: 'We're doing well and I think we have a 
great future'; ... 'Everything is clicking .... New products are coming in a wave, not a trickle. 
Old products are doing very well'; and 'I am optimistic about [the company's] performance during 
this decade."' (citation omitted)). 
269. See infra notes 273-76 and accompanying text. 
270. See infra notes 277-95 and accompanying text. 
271. See infra notes 296-311 and accompanying text. 
272. See infra notes 296-331 and accompanying text. 
273. 791 F.3d 90, 94, 108-11, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting FY 2007 Annual Report), cert. de-
nied, 84 U.S.LW. 3307 (US Feb. 29, 2016) (No 15-694) 
274. See supra notes 204-29 and accompanying text (discussing the case). 
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of its revenue, and (ii) PNDs "had been the focus of recent public statements. "275 
The D.C. Circuit found that the "very strong" sales comment was not puffery be-
cause the "statement was tied to a product and a time period and it was not too 
vague to be material. "276 
In IBEW Local Union No. 58 Pension Trust Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Banh of 
Scotland Group, PLC, the Second Circuit also addressed puffery, and in addition 
wrestled with more difficult issues of quantitative and qualitative materiality and 
statements about the relationship between a bank and its regulator during the 
credit crisis. 277 Purchasers of American Depository Shares ("ADS") of The 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group, PLC ("RBS") alleged that RBS and several exec-
utives violated Rule lOb-5 during the period between October 17, 2007, and 
January 20, 2009, by making allegedly fraudulent statements about (i) RBS's ac-
quisition of a Dutch bank named ABN AMRO; (ii) RBS's exposure to the sub-
prime mortgage market; and (iii) a Rights lssue.278 Ultimately, RBS proved to 
be an investor disaster, as the British government rescued the bank through a 
$40 billion bailout in exchange for a ninety-four percent ownership interest, 
and the price of the ADS declined significantly during the class period.279 
Second Circuit authority holds that "[s] tatements of corporate optimism may 
be actionable securities violations if 'they are worded as guarantees or are sup-
ported by specific statements of fact, or if the speaker does not genuinely or rea-
sonably believe them."'280 The court found the following statements about the 
acquisition to be "inactionable puffery"281-that integration of ABN AMRO 
into RBS was "off to a promising start," that the deal "has rarely seemed more 
attractive and relevant than it does at this point," that "the positive view we 
have of the ABN [AMRO] businesses has been confirmed," that the " [ u] nderlying 
performance of retained ABN AMRO businesses [is] in line with expectations," 
that "[t]here are a lot of areas where [the ABN AMRO acquisition] just goes 
ching, ching, ching, ching, ching," that "[w]e are happy we bought what we 
thought we bought," and that ABN AMRO businesses were "kind of in line with 
where we thought they would be and probably [are] slightly ahead of the equiva-
lent number last year. "282 Those statements were "not worded as guarantees and 
there [were] no allegations that defendants did not reasonably believe them. "283 
275. Harman, 791 F.3d at 109. 
276. Id. Compare Pension Fund Grp. v. Tempur-Pedic Int'!, Inc., 614 F. App'x 237, 245 (6th Cir. 
2015) (concluding that statement that issuer had "strengthened [its] competitiveness" was "immate-
rial as a matter of law"); id. at 24 7 (concluding that reference to the issuer's "consumer preferred" 
product line was puffery). 
277. 783 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 2015) 
278. Id. at 387. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 392 (quoting In re Int'! Bus. Machs. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (ci-
tations omitted)). 
281. Id. 
282. Id. at 388 (quoting, in the first and second instances, an RBS press release dated December 6, 
2007; and quoting, in the remaining instances, an RBS conference call on February 28, 2008). 
283. Id. at 392. 
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Quantitative materiality. As to subprime assets, the plaintiffs alleged that an 
RBS press release on December 6, 2007, which represented "[t]otal U.S. sub-
prime exposure[ ]" to be $10.3 billion, understated the true exposure by $6.8 
billion.284 The Second Circuit addresses quantitative materiality in a two-step 
process that it draws from SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99.285 In the 
first step, the court determines whether the misstatement is less than five percent 
of the relevant company-wide number. 286 If the misstatement falls below that 
threshold, the court preliminarily considers the misstatement immaterial but 
proceeds to a second step, which addresses whether the error is nevertheless ma-
terial for any of a number of qualitative reasons. 287 In RBS, the alleged $6.8 bil-
lion understatement "constitute [ d] less than 4% of RBS's total asset backed secu-
rities exposure, and less than 1 % of its total assets," and no qualitative 
consideration applied to make the asserted misstatement material. 288 
Regulator encouragement versus regulator mandate. While the rulings on the ac-
quisition and subprime exposure statements were unanimous-in this opinion 
by which the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal289-the ruling on representa-
tions related to the rights offering split the panel two-to-one. 290 RBS stated on 
April 22, 2008, that the determination to raise capital through the rights offering 
was "purely the Board of RBS['s] decision" and that, while the Financial Services 
Authority ("FSA," RBS's regulator) was "happy to see [RBS] raising capital and 
encourage[d RBS] in [its] plans to do so," RBS was "not asked to raise capital 
by anyone," not even the FSA. 291 The timeline showed that "RBS had already 
started preparations for the Rights Issue by April 4, 2008-five days before 
RBS's conversation with the FSA's CEO, when the FSA purportedly 'specifically 
required' RBS to conduct a Rights Issue."292 Noting that "RBS was not deemed by 
the FSA to have violated FSA's minimum capital guidelines," the majority held 
that the "critical facts were already known to the investing market: RBS needed 
an infusion of capital; it was taking additional write-downs; the FSA was closely 
monitoring RBS's situation and encouraging a Rights Issue; and there was gen-
erally a steep deterioration in market conditions and credit market outlooks. "293 
In light of this context, the majority held that "a reasonable investor would have 
284. Id. at 391 (quoting press release). 
285. Id. at 390-91 (citing SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150, 45151-52 
(Aug. 19, 1999)) 
286. Id. at 390. 
287. Id. at 390-91. 
288. Id. at 391 ("Plaintiffs do not allege that the amount of exposure could have been calculated 
precisely, masks a change in earnings, changes a loss into income or vice versa, or involves an un-
lawful transaction, or that the misstatements resulted in a significant positive market reaction. 
And, although RBS's asset-backed securitization group was a driving factor in its profitability, this 
factor alone does not tip the scales in favor of finding the misstatements material."). 
289. Id. at 387, 394. 
290. Id. at 394 (Leval,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
291. Id. at 388, 392-93 (majority opinion) (quoting public statements by RBS that accompanied 
announcement of Rights Issue). 
292. Id. (quoting testimony of FSA CEO to Parliament in 2012). 
293. Id. 
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deemed the difference between [whether the FSA] 'encouraged' [RBS to raise 
capital or] 'required' [RBS to raise capital] to be immaterial. "294 The dissenting 
panel member disagreed on this point, because "[t]he fact that . . a regulatory 
agency has required a bank to raise capital implies that the regulatory agency 
finds the bank's capital reserves to be dangerously low. "295 
Significance and analysis. It is difficult to reconcile Harman and RBS in a manner 
that provides guidance to issuers and their officers. Similarly, it is difficult to un-
derstand the RBS majority position that, on a motion to dismiss, the difference be-
tween a bank being "encouraged" by a regulator to raise additional capital and "re-
quired" to do so would be immaterial. Those cases illustrate that, before a client 
makes a statement, the counselor may find it hard to advise a client that the content 
constitutes "inactionable puffery." On the other hand, after the client speaks and is 
sued, an aggressive approach to arguing that content is immaterial may be in order. 
Proof of materiality and the relationship between materiality and scienter. In 2015, 
two public enforcement cases highlighted that federal securities law defines ma-
teriality objectively, with one of those cases also holding that the materiality of a 
misrepresentation is relevant to whether a defendant made it with scienter. 
In Flannery v. SEC, the First Circuit vacated an SEC order sanctioning a former 
vice president and head of North American Product Engineering ("Product 
Engineer") at State Street Bank and Trust Company ("State Street"). 296 The 
Commission had found that the Product Engineer violated Rule lOb-5 and section 
l 7(a)297 of the Securities Act, when on May 10, 2007, he presented PowerPoint 
slides to a group of investors that included a client of an institutional consulting 
firm, whose representative (Mr. Hammerstein) also attended the presentation.298 
The Product Engineer used a standard slide to describe a group of State-Street man-
aged funds collectively known as the Limited Duration Bond Fund ("LDBF").299 
Called the "Typical Portfolio Slide," the slide represented, among other things, 
that the LDBF's holdings were distributed, by "sector" market value, so: 
ABS [Asset-Backed Securities]: 55%; 
CMBS [Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities]: 25%; 




294. Id. at 394. 
295. Id. (Leval,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 




297. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). Like a violation of Rule lOb-5, see infra note 357 and accompa-
nying text, a violation of section 17(a)(l) requires proof of scienter, Flannery, 810 F.3d at 9. 
298. Flannery, 810 F.3d at 5-6. 
299. Id. at 3, 6. 
300. Id. at 5 (percentages shown in bar graph on slide). 
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An internal State Street "fact sheet," however, showed that, as of March 31, 2007, 
the LDBF held 100 percent of its assets in ABS. 301 
Mr. Hammerstein testified before an SEC ALJ that he was surprised when 
he later learned that the LDBF was fully invested in ABS, and his consulting 
firm advised its clients to sell their positions in the LDBF because it "felt that 
State Street did not adequately inform [the audience] of the risks in the portfo-
lio."302 Specifically, Mr. Hammerstein's firm sent a letter to its clients "recom-
mending that they liquidate their holdings and citing the May 10 meeting 
where '[t]he LD Bond Fund Portfolio Manager did not disclose the actual 
sector exposure at the time, instead presenting "typical" portfolio characteris-
tics."'303 The First Circuit nevertheless concluded that the Commission's "finding 
of materiality was marginal. "304 The slide stated that the information it presented 
was "Typical" rather than up to date, and the fact sheet showing one hundred 
percent investment in ABS was available six weeks before the May 10 meeting. 305 
The information was also available on State Street's website, 306 and an expert for 
the Product Engineer testified that "a typical investor in an unregistered fund 
would understand that it could specifically request additional information re-
garding the fund. "307 The Product Engineer himself also testified that (i) "in 
his experience, investors did not focus on sector breakdown when making 
their investment decisions and that LDBF investors did not focus on how 
much of the LDBF investment was in ABS versus MBS"; (ii) he "did not recall 
ever discussing the Typical Portfolio Slide or being asked a question about the 
actual sector breakdown when presenting the slide"; and (iii) "[h]e did not up-
date the Typical Portfolio Slide's sector breakdowns because he did not think the 
typical sector breakdowns were important to investors. "308 Nothing in the record 
showed "that the credit risks posed by ABS, CMBS, or MBS were materially dif-
ferent from each other. "309 
Observing that " [ q] uestions of materiality and scienter are connected"-in the 
sense that "[i] f it is questionable whether a fact is material or its materiality is 
marginal, that tends to undercut the argument that defendants acted with the 
requisite intent or extreme recklessness in not disclosing the fact" 310-the 
301. Id.atll. 
302. Id. at 10 (quoting Hammerstein's testimony before ALJ). 
303. Id. (quoting letter). 
304. Id. at 9-10. 
305. Id. at 10-11. 
306. Id. at 11 n.8. But the court added that it did "not suggest that the mere availability of accurate 
information negates an inaccurate statement. Rather, when a slide is labeled 'typical,' and where a 
reasonable investor would not rely on one slide but instead would conduct due diligence when mak-
ing an investment decision, the availability of actual and accurate information is relevant." Id. 
307. Id. at 11 (quoting expert). 
308. Id. at 11-12. 
309. Id. at 10; id. at 10 n.6 ('The Typical Portfolio Slide represented that 85% of the LDBF's in-
vestment was in AAA- and AA-rated bonds (45% and 40% respectively), while the March 31, 2007, 
fact sheet disclosed that 94.46% of its investment was in AAA- and AA-rated bonds (62.2% and 
32.26% respectively)."). 
310. Id. at 9 (quoting City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters Corp., 
632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011)) (alteration added). 
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First Circuit held that the "thin materiality showing" with respect to the Typical 
Portfolio Slide "cannot support a finding of scienter. "311 
Materiality of misrepresentations in professional-to-professional communications in 
the securities industry. The Second Circuit also published a 2015 opinion that ad-
dressed materiality in the context of transactions between professionals in the fi-
nancial industry. The defendant in United States v. Litvak, worked as a trader at 
Jefferies&:: Co. ('Jefferies"), a broker-dealer. 312 The defendant sometimes bought 
and sometimes sold debt securities for Jefferies' customers, and sometimes did so 
for Jefferies itself. 313 The government charged that the defendant made three 
types of misrepresentations to counterparties. 314 
First, in some instances, the defendant misrepresented the acquisition costs of 
residential MBS ("RMBS"), as exemplified by a transaction involving the Alliance-
Bernstein Legacy Securities Fund ("ABF"), when he stated that Jefferies had 
paid $58 (based on a $100 face value) when in fact Jefferies bought the RMBS 
for $57.50-a difference of 50 cents. 315 The ABF representative who dealt 
with the defendant in the transaction testified that the difference "would have 
'mattered' and been 'important' to him"316 "[b]ecause we use that information 
of him buying at 58 to set the price that we would buy it at. If we could have 
bought it cheaper, that would have been better for my investors. "317 ABF paid 
$58.00 per $100 face value for a total of about $12 million for the RMBS, but 
would have paid approximately $60,000 less if the price had been lower by 
50 cents per $100. 318 
Second, the government charged that the defendant misrepresented-to sell-
ers of securities-the price at which Jefferies had arranged to resell the securities, 
as exemplified by a transaction in which the defendant represented to York Cap-
ital Management ("York"), a hedge fund selling RMBS to Jefferies, that Jefferies 
had agreed to resell the RMBS for $61.25 (based on a $100 face value) when, 
in fact, Jefferies had agreed to resell the RMBS for $62.375. 319 The York repre-
sentative with whom the defendant negotiated agreed to sell the securities to Jef-
feries for $61.00 per $100 face value so that Jefferies could make a $.25 profit on 
the resale, but testified that the "difference [in Jefferies' resale price] would have 
been 'important' to her"320 "'[b]ecause that mean[t] that [she] didn't get the best 
execution and that [the defendant] sold them for a lot higher than what he had 
311. Id. at 11; see infra notes 490-91 and accompanying text (discussing similar analysis by First 
Circuit). In a portion of the decision not summarized in the text, the First Circuit also vacated the 
Commission's decision sanctioning a former chief investment officer at State Street. Flannery, 810 
F.3d at 3-4, 12-15. 
312. 808 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2015) 
313. Id. at 167. 
314. Id. at 167-68. 
315. Id. at 167. 
316. Id. (quoting testimony of ABF representative). 
317. Id. at 167 n.5 (quoting testimony of ABF representative). 
318. Id. at 167. 
319. Id. at 167-68. 
320. Id. at 168 (quoting testimony of York representative). 
1042 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 71, Summer 2016 
told [her]."'321 If York had received $62.125 (to facilitate Jefferies making a 
$0.25 profit on resale at the price at which Jefferies had actually agreed to resell), 
York would have garnered about $228,500 more in this transaction totalling ap-
proximately $20 million. 322 
Third, the government alleged that the defendant represented-to second 
parties-that Jefferies was negotiating with third parties instead of dealing in 
its own inventory, as exemplified in a transaction with a hedge fund called Mag-
netar Capital ("MC'), in which the defendant said that Jefferies was buying RMBS 
from a third party at $53.00 (on a $100 face value) in order to resell them to MC, 
when in fact Jefferies already owned the RMBS that the defendant was selling to 
MC and had bought them for $51.25. 323 MC paid Jefferies $53.25 so that Jef-
feries could make a $0.25 per $100 face value "commission."324 The represen-
tative of MC testified that, had he known the truth, the difference in the price 
Jefferies had paid would have "reflected 'a very different situation,"' and that, 
if he had known that Jefferies was selling from its own inventory, MC would 
not have paid any "commission" at all. 325 If MC had not paid the "commission," 
then MC would have paid approximately $14,000 less (on a total cost of about 
$5.5 million) to acquire the RMBS. 326 
On this record, the Second Circuit held that "a rational jury could have found 
that [the defendant's] misrepresentations were material" and therefore the trial 
court had properly sent that issue to the jury. 327 But, in reversing the convic-
tion,328 the appellate court also held that the trial court exceeded its discretion 
in excluding the defendant's proffered expert testimony that the RMBS market 
was not efficient and that professionals set the prices on which they bought 
and sold by using computer models to determine the securities' value rather 
than by statements made by counterparties. 329 
Significance and analysis. Both Flannery and Litvak suggest that information might 
not be material even though financial sector participants in the transactions-in 
Flannery, the consulting firm providing advice to institutional investors and, in Lit-
vak, representatives of a mutual fund and two hedge funds-thought that the in-
formation was important. The law permits such a conclusion because the law 
321. Id. at 168 n.6 (quoting testimony of York representative). 
322. Id. at 168. 
323. Id. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 168 & n.7 (quoting testimony of MC representative). 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 175. 
328. Id. at 174-75, 178-85, 190. 
329. Id. at 180-84. The Second Circuit also held that the trial judge wrongly excluded expert testi-
mony that the defendant dealt at arms-length with counterparties. Id. at 186-88. Proposed testimony 
regarding the "nature of [the defendant's] relationship with the alleged victims formed the context in 
which the jury had to consider whether the portfolio managers and traders who testified reflected the 
views of a reasonable investor ... [and] would have supported [the defendant's] materiality defense." 
Id. at 187-88. The proffered expert opinion would also have rebutted testimony by one counterparty 
representative, who stated his understanding that the defendant was acting as the counterparty's 
agent. Id. at 186-88. 
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judges materiality objectively rather than subjectively-from the viewpoint of the 
"reasonable investor" rather than simply that of the alleged victim. 330 Nevertheless, 
it should be an infrequent case in which this principle is invoked to raise the se-
rious possibility that professional participants in the securities markets might not 
fit within what must surely be the broad confines of the term "reasonable 
investor. "331 
DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
Item 303(a)(3)(ii) of Regulation S-K requires that a public company "[d]escribe 
any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably 
expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or reve-
nues or income from continuing operations."332 In 2014, the Ninth Circuit held, 
in the NVIDIA Securities Litigation, that "Item 303 does not create a duty to disclose 
for purposes of Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5."333 In 2015, the Second Circuit 
disagreed. 
The plaintiffs, in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, focused on Morgan Stan-
ley's (i) purchase of credit default swaps ("CDSs"), by which Morgan Stanley 
made annual payments in exchange for the sellers' promises to pay Morgan Stan-
ley if mezzanine tranches of RMBS supporting certain collateralized debt obliga-
tions ("CDOs") defaulted or declined in value (referred to in the opinion as the 
"Short Position"), and (ii) sale of CDSs, by which the purchasers paid Morgan 
Stanley annual payments in exchange for Morgan Stanley's promise to pay the 
purchasers if super-senior tranches defaulted or declined in value (referred to 
in the opinion as the "Long Position"). 334 In effect, Morgan Stanley "was betting 
that defaults in the subprime mortgage markets would be significant enough to 
impair the value of the higher-risk CDO tranches referenced by the Short Posi-
tion, but not significant enough to impair the value of the lower-risk CDO 
tranches referenced by the Long Position. "335 When it turned out that the finan-
cial crisis was far more serious than Morgan Stanley anticipated, the firm lost bil-
lions of dollars on the combined Short and Long Positions. 336 
The plaintiffs brought a Rule lOb-5 action-on behalf of all those who bought 
Morgan Stanley stock between June 20, 2007, and November 19, 2007-against 
Morgan Stanley and six present and former officers, basing the claim, among 
other things, on the allegation that, "[b]y July 4[, 2007,] at the latest, [d]efen-
dants knew that the Long Position was reasonably expected to have an unfavor-
330. Id. at 175, 184. 
331. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) ("The speculators 
and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protec-
tion afforded conservative traders."). 
332. 17 CFR. § 229 303(a)(3)(ii) (2015) 
333. In re NVIDIA Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2349 
(2015) 
334. 776 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2015) 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
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able material effect on revenue" and that the defendants violated the requirement 
of Regulation S-K Item 303(a)(3)(ii) by failing to disclose that fact in Morgan 
Stanley's Forms 10-Q for the second and third quarters of 2007. 337 Specifically 
disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's NVIDIA decision, 338 the Second Circuit 
broke the analysis down into two parts: (i) duty to disclose and (ii) material-
ity. 339 Thus, in a Rule lOb-5 action based on an omission, a plaintiff must 
plead that the defendants had a duty to disclose the omitted fact. 340 Such a 
duty "may arise when there is [(a)] 'a corporate insider trad[ing] on confidential 
information,' [(b)] a 'statute or regulation requiring disclosure,' or [(c)] a corpo-
rate statement that would otherwise be 'inaccurate, incomplete, or mislead-
ing."'341 Regulation S-K Item 303(a)(3)(ii) sufficed-per category (b)-to impose 
a duty to disclose sufficient for Rule lOb-5. 342 Although a plaintiff must also 
plead and prove in a Rule lOb-5 omission case that the undisclosed fact was ma-
terial,343 a plaintiff that shows both that the defendant violated the duty to dis-
close under Item 303(a)(3)(ii) and that the undisclosed fact was material, can 
win a judgment, provided, of course, that the plaintiff can plead and prove all 
other elements of a Rule lOb-5 claim, including scienter. 344 
In the Morgan Stanley case, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs "ade-
quately alleged that Defendants breached their Item 303 duty to disclose that 
Morgan Stanley faced a deteriorating subprime mortgage market that, in light 
of the company's exposure to the market, was likely to cause trading losses 
that would materially affect the company's financial condition."345 Plaintiffs al-
leged that a Morgan Stanley economist wrote on February 27, 2007, that "the 
long-awaited meltdown in subprime mortgage lending is now underway," and 
Morgan Stanley analysts reported in the summer of that year that "[r]atings 
downgrades in [asset backed] CDO tranches are inevitable and material. "346 Mor-
gan Stanley allegedly had written down the Long Position by $300 million by the 
time the class period opened and formed a task force to develop strategies to sell 
down assets at risk as a result of the subprime collapse.347 This was enough to 
337. Id. at 96, 98 (quoting joint appendix) (first and second alterations by appellate court). 
338. Id. at 103-04. 
339. Id. at 100-03. 
340. Id. at 100-01. 
341. Id. at 101 (quoting Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting, in 
the first instance, Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987); then quoting, in the 
second and third instances, Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990) (en bane))). 
342. Id. at 101-02; id. at 102 ("Item 303 imposes the type of duty to speak that can, in appropriate 
cases, give rise to liability under Section lO(b)."). 
34 3. Id. at 102-03. For an explanation of how Item 303(a)(3)(ii) can require disclosure of facts 
that are not material, see 2014 Case/aw Developments, supra note 68, at 950-51. 
344. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103-04 (reprising the court's "decision that failure to comply 
with Item 303 in a Form 10-Q can give rise to liability under Rule 1 Ob-5 so long as the omission 
is material ... and the other elements of Rule lOb-5 have been established"); id. at 100 (listing 
the elements of a private cause of action in a Rule lOb-5 case, including scienter). 
345. Id. at 104. 
346. Id. (quoting joint appendix). 
347. Id. at 104-05. 
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plead that the company "was faced with a 'known trend[ ] . that [was] reason-
ably expected to have material effects' on the company's financial position. "348 
The Second Circuit, however, added a significant caveat. While rejecting-as 
"generic"-the defense claim that Morgan Stanley satisfied its disclosure obliga-
tions under Item 303(a)(3)(ii) "by disclosing the deterioration of the real estate, 
credit, and subprime mortgage markets, and its potential negatively to affect 
Morgan Stanley," the court held that the firm did not need to "announce its in-
ternal business strategies or to identify the particulars of its trading positions 
such as the Long Position. "349 It "needed to disclose only that it faced deteriorat-
ing real estate, credit, and subprime mortgage markets, that it had significant ex-
posure to those markets, and that if the trends came to fruition, the company 
faced trading losses that could materially affect its financial condition."350 
That caveat not affecting the holding, the complaint adequately alleged an 
Item 303(a)(3)(ii) violation, and the court then proceeded to the second require-
ment for an omissions claim under Rule lOb-5, resolving that requirement by 
"assum[ing], arguendo, that [the Morgan Stanley] omission was material."351 
The Second Circuit nevertheless affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
the case352-insofar as it pertained to the failure to make the Regulation S-K 
Item 303(a)(3)(ii) disclosure353-due to the plaintiffs' failure to plead facts rais-
ing a strong inference of scienter. 354 The court read Morgan Stanley's formation 
of the task force as showing "that Morgan Stanley was in the process of assessing 
the risk to its proprietary trade during the second and third quarters of 2007," 
and that the complaint failed to allege "when employees realized that the more 
pessimistic assessments of the market were likely to come to fruition and that 
they would be unable to reduce the Long Position."355 Taking into account 
that Morgan Stanley was, in the second and third quarters, still making 
money on the Short Position and that the firm "did fully report its exposure to 
mortgage securities backed by subprime loans in November 2007-less than a 
month after its third quarter filing and a month in advance of the next quarterly 
report"-the plaintiffs were simply, in the court's view, complaining that Morgan 
Stanley should have made a disclosure somewhat earlier than it did, which may 
348. Id. at 105 (quoting Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results 
of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427, 22429 (May 24, 1989) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241 & 271)). 
349. Id. 
350. Id. at 105-06. It is hard to see the difference between the language that Morgan Stanley did 
use, see supra note 349 and accompanying text, and the language the court said Morgan Stanley should 
have used, see supra text accompanying this note. Perhaps the key was that Morgan Stanley should 
have linked the subprime mortgage deterioration to the firm's trading activities. 
351. Id. at 104, 106. 
352. Id. at 108. 
353. The published opinion deals only with the portion of the plaintiffs' case alleging that Morgan 
Stanley's Item 303 violation concealed the extent of its exposure to the subprime mortgage market. Id. 
at 98, 100. In an accompanying summary order, the court affirmed dismissal of the rest of the case. 
Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 598 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2015). 
354. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 106-07. 
355. Id. at 107. 
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have suggested negligence, but did not suggest the kind of "consciously reckless" 
conduct prohibited by Rule lOb-5. 356 
SCIENTER AND PLEADING SCIENTER 
To be successful on a Rule lOb-5 claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove 
that the defendant acted with scienter-defined by the Supreme Court as "a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"357 and ex-
panded by all courts of appeals to include some form of recklessness with re-
spect to misleading investors. 358 The Exchange Act requires that a Rule lOb-5 
complaint "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that 
the defendant acted with [that] required state of mind."359 To satisfy the statu-
tory pleading standard, the facts alleged in the complaint, together with judi-
cially noticeable material, must raise an inference of scienter that is "cogent 
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent. "360 
Four noteworthy court of appeals opinions in 2015 considered scienter in 
cases where plaintiffs alleged faulty accounting. The Eleventh Circuit found 
that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege the scienter of a CFO and auditor as 
to cash balances where the issuer reported $100 million in cash on hand but de-
faulted on a $3 .5 million debt payment. 361 The Second Circuit held scienter al-
legations inadequate against an auditor where the issuer's U.S. financial state-
ments reported far more favorable numbers than the statements that the issuer 
submitted to a regulator in China. 362 The Tenth Circuit found scienter allega-
tions insufficient in a case where an issuer delayed reporting a billing dispute 
with a major customer, with the decision resting on the defendants' non-
culpable explanation that it took time for the dispute to filter up the management 
chain and that, after top management appreciated that there was an issue, man-
agement investigated to get to the bottom of the problem and resolved the billing 
with the customer, before disclosing it. 363 The Fifth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs 
failed to allege scienter in a case built around mis-valuation of MBS where the 
valuations involved subjective judgments.364 
In another case also involving alleged financial fraud, the Tenth Circuit held 
that a complaint satisfied the high scienter pleading standard applicable to pri-
vate Rule lOb-5 claims where a CEO misstated the reason that a strategic partner 
declined to purchase an interest in assets that the CEO's company owned, with 
the court rejecting the argument that, if the CEO mischaracterized why the deal 
failed, he did so only to help his company (and its shareholders) obtain a high 
356. Id. 
357. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). 
358. 8 LOUIS Loss ET AL., SECUR!TlES REGULATION 150 n.544 (4th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2016). 
359. 15 USC § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012) 
360. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007). 
361. See infra notes 370-82 and accompanying text. 
362. See infra notes 383-406 and accompanying text. 
363. See infra notes 407-24 and accompanying text. 
364. See infra notes 425-55 and accompanying text. 
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price from other potential buyers and therefore committed no securities 
fraud. 365 
Two decisions ruled on scienter allegations in cases originating in the drug 
and medical device industry. The First Circuit found scienter pleading inade-
quate in an action against a medical device company that made various public 
palliative comments during a long-running dialogue with the FDA over off-
label marketing. 366 The Fourth Circuit, however, held that plaintiffs properly al-
leged scienter where a drug company specifically described communications 
with the FDA, but omitted negative facts from those descriptions. 367 
Finally, in two cases, courts of appeals considered more general scienter is-
sues. The Ninth Circuit addressed imputation of an officer's scienter to a corpo-
rate defendant. The court of appeals held that the "adverse interest" exception to 
such an imputation has, itself, an exception and does not apply where the officer 
communicates to investors with apparent authority from the company. 368 The 
Second Circuit ruled that scienter does not require an intent to harm. 369 
CFO and auditor liability premised on size of accounting inconsistency. Investors in 
Brophy v. ]iangbo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. brought a Rule lOb-5 action against Jiang-
bo's former CFO and its former outside auditor. 370 Plaintiffs based their case 
against the CFO on the ground that she had signed certifications to the Jiangbo 
periodic filings that (i) stated the company had adequate internal controls and 
that the financial statements were accurate, even though the filings overstated 
the company's cash balances, and (ii) failed to disclose a related-party transaction 
in which Jiangbo transferred $31 million to a company controlled by the Jiangbo 
chairman. 371 Plaintiffs based their case against the outside auditor on the audi-
tor's unqualified opinion on annual financial statements for fiscal 2010-state-
ments suffering from the same two defects, overstating Jiangbo's cash balances 
and failing to disclose the related-party transaction. 372 The Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed dismissal of the case as to both defendants because the investors failed to 
adequately plead scienter. 373 
As to the CFO and the cash balances, the investors relied largely on the theory 
that the misstatement was so large that the CFO must have been aware of it. 374 
But, although the plaintiffs pointed to the inconsistency between the approximately 
$100 million in cash reported in the company's filings during the June 8, 2010, 
through May 31, 2011, class period and Jiangbo's default in early 2011 on a 
365. See infra notes 456-68 and accompanying text. 
366. See infra notes 469-500 and accompanying text. 
367. See infra notes 501-29 and accompanying text. 
368. See infra notes 530-39 and accompanying text. 
369. See infra notes 540-43 and accompanying text. 
370. 781 F.3d 1296, 1298-1300 (11th Cir. 2015) 
371. Id. at 1300-01. 
372. Id. at 1301. 
373. Id. at 1298-99, 1307-08. 
374. Id. at 1302-03. 
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$3.5 million debt payment, 375 the plaintiffs "fail[ed] to allege any particular amount 
or even a range" of the actual cash on hand and without such "specifics, [they could 
not] persuasively allude to the magnitude of the fraud as a basis for a strong infer-
ence that [the individual defendant] must have known of the errors as CF0."376 As 
to the related-party transaction, plaintiffs alleged that the CFO's resignation during 
an audit committee investigation, and her obstruction of the investigation into that 
transaction, demonstrated scienter. 377 However, balanced against the intuition that 
resigning during a fraud investigation appeared incriminating was "the fact that [the 
CFO] continued[, after the resignation,] to work for the company on a part-time 
basis" which "equally supports a nonculpable explanation" for the departure. 378 
Moreover, while the CFO did not provide the audit committee with the information 
it requested, "she personally prepared the materials for review and preliminarily 
agreed to turn them over pending the company's approval."379 This weighed so 
much in her favor that, even though "she neglected a prevailing duty to provide 
her materials to the committee regardless of the chairman's wishes," these events 
did not "add much weight to an inference of scienter. "380 
The appellate court found the pleadings against the auditor deficient as well. 
The auditor was named solely because of one clean opinion on one year's finan-
cial statements, and the complaint did "not set out in what ways [the] audit [pro-
ducing that opinion] was deficient. "381 While the auditor declined to stand for 
reappointment and did so "around the same time as [the CFO] resigned and 
[an] SEC investigation began," there was "no connection between the fact of 
an SEC investigation and [the auditor's] state of mind that a reviewing court 
may reasonably draw on the face of the complaint. "382 
Auditor liability premised on issuer submitting financial statements to U.S. regula-
tors that differed from those that the issuer submitted to foreign regulators. Following 
dismissal of the auditor defendants from claims in the first amended complaint, 
375. Id. at 1300. The district court decision includes the class period. In re jiangbo Pharm., Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248 (S.D. Fla. 2012). The plaintiffs implied that, ifthe company 
had really possessed the large amount of cash it reported, it would not have defaulted on the rela-
tively small debt principal payment. Brophy, 781 F.3d at 1300. 
376. Brophy, 781 F.3d at 1304. 
377. Id. at 1305. The CFO resigned effective on March 31, 2011. ]iangbo Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 
2d at 1260. Two members of the company's audit committee resigned on June 6, 2011, and their 
resignation letter-which complained about unsatisfied investigative requests concerning the $31 
million related-party transaction-allegedly disclosed that transaction for the first time. Brophy, 
781 F.3d at 1300-01. 
378. Brophy, 781 F.3d at 1305. 
379. Id. 
380. Id. As to a general duty to disclose the related-party transaction to investors, the complaint 
failed to allege when the CFO became aware of that transaction and, therefore, failed properly to al-
lege that its absence constituted a material omission in the company's SEC filings for which the CFO 
was responsible. Id. at 1306. The court also invoked facts that generally argued against the CFO hav-
ing acted with scienter, including that she was located in Florida while jiangbo conducted its oper-
ations in China, and that she did not sell any company stock during the period of the alleged fraud. 
Id. 
381. Id. at 1307. 
382. Id. The court added that, "[a]s an external auditor, [the auditor defendant] was a step more 
removed than [the CFO] from any alleged indicators of fraud." Id. 
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the In re Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. plaintiff moved to file a second 
amended complaint, alleging that the auditors "falsely represent [ed] that they 
performed their audits of Advanced Battery Technologies, Inc. ('ABAT) in accor-
dance with professional standards and that ABAT's filings accurately reflected its 
financial condition from . . 2007 through ... 2010."383 Following the district 
court's denial of that motion on the basis that filing the new complaint would be 
futile, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment dismissing the auditors on the 
basis that the proposed new complaint did not plead facts raising a strong infer-
ence of the auditors' scienter. 384 
ABAT manufactured rechargeable polymer lithium-ion batteries. 385 The com-
pany operated principally in China, but listed its stock on a U.S. exchange after 
a reverse merger in 2004. 386 ABAT engaged one of the two auditor defendants 
from 2006 through December 14, 2010 (with this defendant auditing the years 
2007 through 2009). 387 ABAT engaged the second from December 14, 2010, to 
the end of the class period (with this defendant auditing the year 2010). 388 
As to the first auditor, the plaintiff pled that it had access to ABAT's filings 
with the Chinese Administration of Industry and Commerce ("AIC"), which fil-
ings reported dramatically poorer results than the results that ABAT included in 
its SEC filings. 389 The plaintiff referred to an expert's opinion "that 'no reason-
able auditor would have failed to obtain ABAT's AIC filings."' 390 The plaintiff, 
however, "conceded . [that] none of the accounting standards on which he 
relies-the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, Statements on Auditing 
Standards, or GAAP-specifically requires an auditor to inquire about or review 
a company's foreign regulatory filings. "391 The "conclusory statement" by the ex-
pert did not change the court's view that those accounting standards did not 
"impos[e] a general duty to inquire[,] the breach of which would constitute reck-
lessness. "392 The plaintiff also contended that a duty to review the AIC filings 
befell the auditor because the ABAT financial statements prepared for SEC filings 
showed "unusually high profit margins."393 The Second Circuit, however, held 
383. 781 F.3d 638, 641 (2d Cir. 2015) 
384. Id. at 641, 644-46. 
385. Id. at 642. 
386. Id. 
387. Id. at 643. 
388. Id. The class period ran from May 15, 2007 to March 29, 2011. First Amended Consolidated 
Class Action Complaint at para. 1, In re Advanced Battery Techs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2279 (CM), 2012 
WL 3758085 (SD NY Aug. 29, 2012), 2011 WL 12882766. 
389. Advanced Battery, 781 F.3d at 642, 645. The court provided particulars: 
[F]rom 2007 to 2009 ABAT reported losses to the AIC while it reported significant profits to the 
SEC. The differences were indisputably material. Taking 2007 as an example, ABAT reported to 
the AIC that its revenues were approximately $145,000 and that it suffered an operating loss of 
$1 million, while it reported to the SEC revenues of $31.9 million and a profit of $10.2 million. 
Id. at 642. 
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that "ABATs report of high profit margins in its SEC filings triggered, at most, a 
duty to perform a more rigorous audit of those filings," rather than a duty to com-
pare those filings with the AIC filings, and added that any failure by the auditor 
to infer wrongdoing from the high margins did not amount to recklessness. 394 
As for the plaintiff's argument that ABAT deserved extra scrutiny because its 
stock became listed on a U.S. exchange through a reverse merger, the plaintiff 
did "not allege that heightened scrutiny of Chinese companies that used reverse 
mergers in the United States began prior to mid-2011-in other words, after the 
relevant audits in this case. "395 Finally, with respect to the first auditor and 
ABATs overall financial results, the plaintiff asserted that the auditor had access 
to the underlying data that produced the financial statements filed with the AIC, 
that that data contradicted the numbers in the SEC-bound financial statements 
the auditor examined, and that the auditor's "failure to spot the discrepancies 
was reckless."396 The Second Circuit, however, found "more compelling" the in-
ference "that ABAT maintained two sets of data-one for its Chinese regulators 
and another for its regulators in the United States-and fed [the auditor] false 
data to complete its audits. "397 
In addition to contending that the first auditor failed to properly investigate 
ABATs financial results, the plaintiff contended that (i) ABATs audited financial 
statements for 2007 and 2008 falsely identified ZQ Power-Tech Co. Ltd. ("ZQ") 
as a wholly owned subsidiary of a wholly owned subsidiary when, in fact, ZQ 
was owned by the ABAT chairman/CEO and other investors, who supposedly 
had assigned the "benefits and obligations" of their ownership to ABAT; 398 
and (ii) the auditor was reckless in failing to discover that ABAT had only a ben-
eficial interest in ZQ rather than a legal interest. 399 The Second Circuit found 
that it could, at most, infer negligence from those allegations,400 not the con-
scious recklessness required for auditor liability under Rule lOb-5. 401 
The allegations against the second auditor focused on a December 2010 trans-
action in which ABAT purchased Shenzhen Zhongqiang Energy Science&:: Tech-
nology Co , Ltd. ("SZ Ltd") for $20 million. 402 The plaintiff alleged that (i) SZ 
Ltd. had lost money in each year of its existence; (ii) ABATs chairman/CEO 
owned SZ Ltd , having bought it in 2008 for only $1 million; and (iii) the second 
auditor "'would have' discovered the fraudulent nature of the ... acquisition had 
it performed 'the most basic of audit duties."'403 However, "conditional allega-
394. Id. (citing, as to the last point, Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
395. Id. 
396. Id. 
397. Id. at 645-46. 
398. Id. at 642-4 3. 
399. Id. at 646. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. at 644. 
402. Id. at 642-4 3. 
403. Id. at 642-43, 646 (quoting proposed second amended complaint). 
Caselaw Developments 2015 1051 
tions of the sort 'that [a defendant] "would" have learned the truth' about a com-
pany's fraud 'if [it] had performed the "due diligence" it promised' are generally 
insufficient to establish the requisite scienter for private securities fraud claims 
'under the PSLRA's heightened pleading instructions."'404 While the plaintiff 
also contended that the "inflated purchase price should have alerted [the audi-
tor] that the transaction was a sham,"405 the Second Circuit found no allegation 
in the complaint that the auditor knew that the price was too high, and the au-
ditor's "failure to uncover and appreciate the significance of the inflated price . 
[did] not represent 'an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary 
care."'406 
Significance and analysis. Advanced Battery is very auditor-friendly. Nonethe-
less, auditors who provide opinions on the financial statements of companies 
that are filing financial statements with regulators other than the SEC might use-
fully consider whether the audit should include an examination of those other 
financials. 
Delay in obtaining information about billing problem and investigation of problem 
before restatement. The In re Gold Resource Corp. Securities Litigation plaintiff al-
leged Rule lOb-5 financial fraud beginning with the issuer's January 30, 2012, 
announcement of 2011 results and continuing to November 8, 2012, when 
the issuer disclosed that it (i) was resolving a billing dispute with a customer, 
(ii) was restating its financial results for the first and second quarters of 2012, 
and (iii) had found a material weakness in internal controls relating to assay sam-
pling by which it billed customers for minerals. 407 The financial fraud allegedly 
rendered false or misleading (i) reports of record results for 2011 and the first 
quarter of 2012, (ii) a statement in the issuer's 10-K that management had con-
cluded that internal control over financial reporting was effective, and (iii) state-
ments in the 10-Qs for the first and second quarters of 2012 that there were no 
changes in internal control over financial reporting. 408 
The asserted financial fraud revolved around the contract between Gold Re-
source Corporation ("GRC") and its customer for product the company mined 
in Mexico. 409 The contract permitted GRC to assay samples of the product be-
fore shipment and provisionally bill ninety percent of the full price based on 
that sampling. 410 The customer then assayed the product on arrival at the cus-
tomer's warehouse. 411 If the customer's assay result differed materially from 
404. Id. at 646 (quoting S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 110, 112 (2d Cir. 
2009)) 
405. Id. 
406. Id. (quoting Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
407. 776 F.3d 1103, 1106, 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2015) 
408. Id. at 1109-10. 
409. Id. at 1106-07. "GRC had only two buyers to whom it sold all of its [product]-subsidiaries 
of the Trafigura Group." Id. at 1107. 
410. Id. at 1107. 
411. Id. 
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GRCs, an umpire conducted an assay and the buyer's final bill was adjusted ac-
cordingly.412 These adjustments eventually led to the restatement. 413 
The plaintiff characterized this set of events as an "overbilling scheme" that 
GRC implemented to inflate its financial results. 414 The plaintiff pled that 
GRC and the individual defendants at GRC acted with scienter based on, 
among other things, the simplicity of the relevant accounting rules, the com-
pany's statement in a November 8, 2012 Form 8-K ("8-K"), that, "[a]s of Septem-
ber 30, 2012, management believe[d] the internal control deficiency ha[d] been 
remediated" (which meant, according to the plaintiff, that the defendants were 
aware of material billing problems by that date), the company's restatement, 
the circumstance that the error affected "core operations," and the small number 
of employees at the company.415 Affirming the district court's dismissal in favor 
of the defendants,416 the Tenth Circuit relied largely on a transcript of statements 
that GRCs CEO made during a November 2012 conference call to conclude that 
the defendants provided a "plausible, opposing inference" that their conduct was 
without fraud. 417 
The plausible explanation was that it took GRC some time to discover and sort 
out the billing dispute. According to the company's account, employees in 
Mexico did not initially credit the buyer's assay results and therefore did not ad-
vise management in Denver of the assay discrepancy until the umpire's assay re-
sults became available in the third quarter of 2012.418 When the problem then 
came to management's attention, the company instituted an investigation, which 
led to the conclusion that the customer had problems at its facility. 419 In settling 
their dispute, the customer paid GRCs provisional bills for April, May, and June, 
but paid amounts based upon its own assays for shipments in February and 
March. 420 In addition, the customer improved security at its receiving facility, 
and GRC began sending a representative with shipments to watch over the prod-
uct until the customer took samples for testing. 421 The Tenth Circuit found that 
the defendants' "explanation regarding the delay in their receiving notice of the 
variances, particularly given the several months it took until the umpire assays 
were finalized,"422 together with the "prudent" decision "to investigate and con-
firm a claimed discrepancy before disclosing it publicly,"423 provided an ade-
412. See id. at 1107 & n.3. 
413. Id. at 1107, 1111. 
414. Id. at 1107. 
415. Id. at 1111(quoting8-K); id. at 1113 (quoting GRC's brief). 
416. Id.atlll9. 
417. Id. at 1116. "Plaintiff referred to the transcript of [the November 2012] conference call in the 
amended complaint but then ignored most of its content. The district court took judicial notice of the 
entire transcript." Id. at 1114 n.7. 
418. Id.at1114. 
419. Id. at 1115. 
420. Id. 
421. Id. 
422. Id. at 1116. 
423. Id. at 1115; see id. at 1116 ("Defendants had every reason not to disclose the disputed var-
iance before the dispute was investigated and settled."). 
Caselaw Developments 2015 1053 
quate competing and nonculpable account, and therefore the court was "not per-
suaded [that] a reasonable person would deem an inference of scienter more co-
gent or compelling than an opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent," so that 
the plaintiff failed to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. 424 
Valuations of MBS. The plaintiffs in Owens v. Jastrow sued former officers of 
Guaranty Financial Group, Inc. ("GFG")-which owned Guaranty Bank (together 
with GFG, "Guaranty")-and Temple-Inland, Inc. ("Temple"), GFG's former par-
ent, pleading a Rule lOb-5 claim on behalf of investors that purchased GFG stock 
between December 12, 2007, and August 24, 2009.425 The claim centered on al-
legations that Guaranty held MBS based on risky, adjustable rate mortgages and 
that, after Temple spun off GFG, Guaranty overvalued those MBS, underreported 
its losses on the MBS, and failed to record those losses as other-than-temporary 
impairment ("OTTI"). 426 Ultimately, in July 2009, Guaranty recorded a $1.62 bil-
lion impairment on its MBS portfolio at the direction of the Office of Thrift Super-
vision ("OTS").427 GFG filed for bankruptcy on August 27, 2009.428 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court dismissal of the second amended 
complaint on the basis that the plaintiffs' allegations failed to raise a strong infer-
ence of scienter.429 Phrasing the issue as whether the complaint pled "sufficient 
facts to allege scienter as to each defendant,"430 the court held initially that, while 
a district court must analyze the scienter allegations holistically, the district court 
"may best make sense of scienter allegations by first looking to the contribution 
of each individual allegation to a strong inference of scienter, especially in a com-
plicated case such as this one[, then] . follow[ing] this initial step with a ho-
listic look at all the scienter allegations. "431 The Fifth Circuit also reiterated its 
rejection of "group pleading" scienter allegations, determined that it generally 
would "disregard"432 "allegations that [were] not tied to a particular defen-
dant,"433 but held that it would consider certain allegations that were tied "to 
more than one defendant ... because they [were] sufficiently particularized. "434 
Turning then to the "[a]llegations common to more than one defendant," the Fifth 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs pled with particularity that three defendants-Ci) the 
CEO/board chair of Temple, who was also the board chair of Guaranty until 
424. Id. at 1118. The court of appeals also observed that the "defendants hold eighteen percent of 
the stock of GRC[,] ... that there is no allegation they sold any of it during the class period," and that 
those facts cut against any scienter inference too. Id. at 1117 n.8. 
425. 789 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing the relationship between Temple, GFG, and 
Guaranty); id. at 534 (identifying the class period, and identifying the claim as an alleged violation of 
Rule lOb-5); id. at 534, 542, 545-46 (identifying the defendants and their positions). The court states 
that its "opinion uses the general term 'Guaranty' when no distinction between GFG and [GB] is war-
ranted." Id. at 533 n.1. This summary uses "Guaranty" where the court uses that word. 
426. Id. at 533-34. 
427. Id. at 534. 
428. Id. 
429. Id. at 534, 547. 
430. Id. at 535. 
431. Id. at 537. 
4 32. Id. at 538. 
433. Id. at 537. 
434. Id. at 538 & n.4. 
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August 26, 2008 ("Guaranty's Chairman"), (ii) the Guaranty President/CEO until 
November 19, 2008, who was also Guaranty's board chair after August 26, 2008 
("Guaranty's CEO"), and (iii) the Guaranty Senior Executive Vice President and 
CFO until July 10, 2009 ("Guaranty's CFO"), who was also the Principal Ac-
counting Officer ("PAO") there from October 27, 2008, until July 10, 2009-
knew that Guaranty was undercapitalized and therefore had a motive to misrep-
resent Guaranty's financial condition in order to more easily attract additional 
investment. 435 While that motive "contribute [d]" to scienter allegations against 
those defendants,436 the lawsuit did not present "the rare case"437 in which a 
strong scienter inference might rest solely on "motive and opportunity" pleading 
because Guaranty was not a "single product" company, and the MBS portfolio 
constituted no more than twenty-two percent of Guaranty's assets.438 Although 
the plaintiffs alleged that "red flags" alerted defendants that the MBS were 
overvalued-Ci) a 250 percent increase, during the nine months preceding 
June 30, 2008, in delinquencies on MBS issued by private institutions rather 
than government-sponsored entities; (ii) a decrease in the value of such MBS 
to sixty percent of cost by June 30, 2008; and (iii) credit rating downgrades 
or negative watch warnings in June and July 2008 on ten MBS owned by 
Guaranty-the Fifth Circuit responded that these events occurred after most 
of the alleged misrepresentations and, in any event, were disclosed by GFG so 
that investors could consider them in assessing the value of the MBS that Guar-
anty owned. 439 Moreover, the court noted that the "defendants' disclosures con-
veyed to investors that its [model-derived] MBS valuations were far from cer-
tain. "440 Combined, the "[d]efendants' disclosure of the 'red flags' and 
candidness about the uncertainty underlying its models neutralize[d] any scien-
ter inference from 'red flags."'441 The final allegation, common to multiple defen-
dants, was that the size of the accounting error-the failure to record $1.62 bil-
lion as OTTI-contributed to a scienter inference.442 The Fifth Circuit held that 
"the magnitude's contribution to an inference of scienter is small, because the 
valuation involved subjective accounting concepts that can yield a wide range 
of reasonable results."443 
4 35. Id. at 538; id. at 542, 545 (identifying the positions that these individual defendants held). 
4 36. Id. at 540. 
4 37. Id. at 539-40 (expressing skepticism that such a "rare set of circumstances," Nathenson v. 
Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 412 (5th Cir. 2001), could still exist in light of Goldstein v. MCI World-
Com, 340 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 2003)) 
4 38. Id. at 540. 
4 39. Id. at 540-41. 
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Moving to allegations against (i) Guaranty's CEO and (ii) Guaranty's CFO, the 
court noted the assertion that Guaranty's Senior Vice President of Investments 
and Secretary of the Asset Liability Committee warned those two defendants 
in January 2007 that Guaranty's model for valuing MBS was deficient in several 
respects, including by use of outdated parameters. 444 Nonetheless, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that "[a] n inference of severe recklessness is more likely when a state-
ment violates an objective rule than when GAAP permits a range of acceptable 
outcomes,"445 and that it was "undeniable that there [was] some subjectivity 
present in Guaranty's decision to continue using its internal models and to 
delay recognizing impairments as other than temporary. "446 Further, the alleged 
January 2007 warning failed to mention GAAP and did "not seem to suggest that 
any issues were so severe that they could lead to a large overvaluation of the MBS 
portfolio. "447 In addition, the defendants relied on AAA ratings on all of Guar-
anty's MBS, as did its regulator, the OTS. 448 While allowing that the plaintiffs 
"c[a]me closest to alleging scienter by noting that [Guaranty's CEO and Guaranty's 
CFO] continued to use the internal models even after the ratings agencies down-
graded or placed some of Guaranty's MBS on negative watch," the court of appeals 
pointed out that Guaranty "never purchased the most junior tranche of MBS, 
meaning that there was a buffer before losses would begin to affect its portfo-
lio. "449 Altogether, the appellate court saw only "allegations combin[ing] 
poor business judgment with financial motive"-not enough to satisfy the high 
pleading standard for scienter in private lawsuits. 450 
The court found the scienter allegations against the remaining individual de-
fendants even more deficient. As to Guaranty's Chairman, the plaintiffs did not 
allege that he was ever told of warnings or internal disagreements over MBS val-
uation, and his "knowledge of Guaranty's undercapitalization and awareness of 
the decline of the California real estate market [did] not rise to the level of a 
'strong inference' of scienter that [was] at least as likely as the alternative infer-
ence that [this defendant] was merely negligent in believing that any decline was 
temporary and would not affect Guaranty's AAA-rated securities. "451 As to a 
fourth defendant-who had been Guaranty's Controller until December 2007, 
when he became Guaranty's Executive Vice President and PAO-the plaintiffs 
did not plead that he was told that the valuation models were deficient,452 
and, at bottom, sought to infer his scienter from his "position of [PAO] at the 
444. Id. at 542. 
445. Id. at 543. 
446. Id. at 544. 
44 7. Id. 
448. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Second Circuit had "held that UBS was not reckless in 
relying on the assets' AAA rating in the face of internal and external uncertainty and disagreement 
about the valuation of mortgage-related assets." Id. (citing City of Pontiac Policemen's & Firemen's 
Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 187 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
449. Id. at 545. 
450. Id. 
451. Id. at 546. 
452. Id. 
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time a large misstatement was made, and that red flags existed. "453 Having already 
held that the size of the misstatement and the red flags were not enough as to other 
defendants, the Fifth Circuit also found them insufficient as to this defendant. 454 
Significance and analysis. Narrowly, Owens suggests difficulties in pleading 
scienter where defendants in cases arising out of the financial crisis failed to 
write down MBS in a timely way after limiting firm exposure to MBS (twenty-
two percent of assets in Owens), buying only triple-A rated MBS, purchasing 
only senior tranches so that defaults would only reach the securities the defen-
dants bought after eating through more junior tranches, and relying on valuation 
models (that necessarily involved judgments) at a time when there were no re-
liable market quotations for MBS. The notion seems to be that the entire financial 
industry was caught by surprise when the valuations for such securities proved 
far too generous. More broadly, Owens suggests that plaintiffs will find it difficult 
to plead scienter in cases based on accounting errors where the defendants con-
vince the court that the challenged numbers rested on judgments.455 
Misstatement of reason for failure of pending transaction. In Nahhhumpun v. Tay-
lor, the plaintiff brought a Rule lOb-5 action based significantly on the statement 
by Delta Petroleum Corporation's ("Delta") board chair, in a July 2010 press re-
lease, that Opon International LLC ("Opon") was not going forward with a pre-
viously announced purchase of a 3 7.5 percent non-operating interest in Delta's 
Vega Area assets, at a price of $400 million. 456 The board chair said: "While 
Opon was unable to arrange financing for a transaction on terms acceptable to 
us, we remain confident in the value of our Vega Area asset [s], and intend to fur-
ther delineate that value as we consider the Company's other strategic alterna-
tives."457 Reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint insofar as it 
rested on this alleged misstatement,458 the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff 
pled falsity by alleging that Opon's former CEO said Opon terminated the trans-
action, not because Opon failed to procure financing, but because Opon con-
cluded that the 37.5 percent interest was not worth $400 million. 459 
The court held that the plaintiff also adequately alleged the board chair's 
scienter by pleading (i) that Opon's CEO had told plaintiff's counsel that 
453. Id. 
454. Id. 
455. In three other decisions, two courts of appeals provided scienter rulings where plaintiffs as-
serted accounting fraud. The Eighth Circuit found no strong inference of scienter where an issuer 
restated financial results only after lengthy discussions with the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance, 
during which the company vigorously defended its decision to record pollution control outlays as 
capital expenditures instead of current period expenses. Podraza v. Whiting, 790 F.3d 828, 832-
33 (8th Cir. 2015). The Second Circuit found scienter allegations insufficient in a case where the is-
suer made seriatum disclosures of internal control weaknesses. In re Magnum Hunter Res. Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 616 F. App'x 442, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2015). That same court found that plaintiffs failed to allege 
facts demonstrating that a defendant bank, or individuals there, intended to deceive by assurances 
concerning risk management-given while a rogue trader was exposing the bank to billions in pos-
sible losses. Westchester Teamsters Pension Fund v. UBS AG, 604 F. App'x 5, 7-8 (2d Cir. 2015). 
456. 782 F.3d 1142, 1145, 114 7 (10th Cir. 2015) 
457. Id. at 114 7 (quoting press release). 
458. Id. at 1162. 
459. Id. at 1148. 
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(a) Opon concluded, after conducting due diligence, that the interest was not 
worth $400 million, (b) Opon had thereupon offered a lower price, and 
(c) Opon's CEO had dealt directly with the Delta board chair in retracting the 
$400 million offer; (ii) that Delta had previously advised the market on multiple 
occasions of the pending deal, in communications that included the $400 mil-
lion figure; and (iii) that therefore "fact-finders could reasonably infer that some-
one in [the Delta board chair's] situation would have recognized the risk of de-
ceiving investors, who presumably would have attributed the impasse to Opon's 
inability to obtain a loan rather than its unwillingness to pay $400 million for a 
37.5% interest in the assets."460 To the Tenth Circuit, the manner in which the 
board chair phrased his comments ran the risk of Delta shareholders "believ[ing] 
that Opon continued to value the 37.5% interest at $400 million" and that there-
fore the investors could "expect offers from other potential buyers with better 
credit than Opon."461 The court found that the plaintiff had pled "facts indicat-
ing that [the board chair] was at least reckless in disregarding the risk that his 
statement would mislead existing and potential shareholders," with "reckless dis-
regard of a substantial likelihood of misleading investors" sufficing for 
scienter. 462 
Significance and analysis. The defense argued that the board chair was simply 
discharging his "fiduciary duty to obtain the highest price for the Vega Area as-
sets"463 and that, if he mischaracterized the reason for Opon's termination, he 
did so to preserve Delta's opportunity to obtain a high price for the assets 
from another buyer. 464 The district court concluded that such a shareholder-
focused motivation cut against scienter. 465 The Tenth Circuit, however, held 
that, regardless of whether the board chair's statement was "intended to mislead 
strategic partners rather than shareholders," the "statement created a risk of mis-
leading shareholders to believe that at least one potential buyer had valued the 
37.5% interest in the Vega assets at $400 million[, and t]his risk was readily ap-
parent, creating an inference of scienter that was at least as strong as an inference 
of innocence."466 The upshot is that, with recklessness sufficing for scienter in all 
circuits,467 the executive or director who dissembles in a public statement in order 
to help his or her company make more money may be liable under Rule lOb-5 if, 
460. Id. at 1150-52; id. at 1152 (including quotation). 
461. Id. at 1152. 
462. Id. at 1150; id. at 1152 ('The risk of misleading investors would have been obvious."). The 
Tenth Circuit reversed only as to the board chair, as the plaintiff had "not adequately pleaded culpa-
bility on the part of other defendants regarding the Opon transaction." Id. at 1157. The Tenth Circuit 
also affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's claim insofar as it rested on allegedly misleading statements 
about Delta's financial condition, liquidity, and value in light of transactions in the industry-holding 
as to those that the plaintiff failed to allege either falsity or scienter. Id. at 1157-62. 
463. Id. at 1153. 
464. Id. at 1152-53 (rejecting, legally and factually, "defendants['] argu[ment] that [the board 
chair] lacked a motive to engage in securities fraud because his interests and Delta's were aligned 
with the interests of shareholders"). 
465. Id. at 1149-50. 
466. Id. at 1153. 
467. See supra note 358 and accompanying text. 
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despite this benign motivation, the executive or director is severely reckless with 
respect to whether the statement will materially mislead shareholders.468 
Disclosures during long-running dialogue with FDA over off-label promotions. The 
plaintiffs in Fire & Police Pension Ass'n of Colorado v. Abiomed, Inc. brought a 
Rule lOb-5 action against Abiomed and its CEO and CFO that centered on Abio-
med's promotion of its micro heart pump (the Impella 2.5) for uses other than 
those for which the FDA had approved it.469 In 2008, the FDA approved the Im-
pella 2.5 "for partial circulatory support for up to six hours. "470 This meant that 
Abiomed could respond to medical professionals' request to use the device for 
other purposes, but could not market the pump for other uses.471 In 2007, the 
FDA granted Abiomed an investigational device exemption ("IDE") to test the Im-
pella 2.5 against the intra-aortic balloon pump ("IABP") for use during angioplas-
ties (high-risk percutaneous coronary interventions ("PCI")), and in 2008, the 
FDA granted Abiomed an IDE to test the Impella 2.5 against the IABP in unstable 
patients who were undergoing PCls due to heart attacks (acute myocardial infarc-
tions ("AMis")).472 The IDEs meant that Abiomed could use the pump for PCls 
during the comparative studies but could not, during the studies, represent that 
the Impella 2.5 was safe and effective for PCls. 473 
The FDA sent Abiomed an Untitled Letter on January 28, 2010, stating that 
Abiomed had improperly promoted the Impella 2.5 for use in high-risk PCls 
and AMis. 474 After Abiomed acknowledged that it had made improper efficacy 
468. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff pied loss causation under "a theory of 'materializa-
tion of a concealed risk."' Nahhhumpun, 782 F.3d at 1153 (quoting from and agreeing with district 
court). The board chair's statement "concealed the risk that 'the Vega Assets were not marketable 
at or near the $400 million price."' Id. at 1154 (quoting district court). That risk was foreseeable be-
cause, "[i]f Opon decided (after conducting its due diligence) that a 37.5% non-operating interest in 
the assets was not worth $400 million, Delta might not find any other potential buyers willing to pay 
$400 million." Id. The "risk materialized on November 9, 2011, when Delta disclosed its inability to 
find a buyer." Id. at 1155. Delta's stock declined after that announcement, and the defendants offered 
no "intervening events that would show disruption of the causal link [between the announcement 
and the stock decline] as a matter of law." Id. at 1156. 
Three additional 2015 opinions addressed scienter in financial cases that did not center on ac-
counting. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs adequately pied scienter where they alleged that 
management represented the issuer was struggling to keep up with demand when, in fact, the com-
pany was swamped with unsold inventory that it was hiding from auditors. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Gov't 
of the V.I. v. Blanford, 794 F.3d 297, 300-02 (2d Cir. 2015). In Lucas v. Icahn, 616 F. App'x 448, 
450 (2d Cir. 2015), the same court ruled that, even assuming an issuer's description of a transaction 
was false with respect to the value of one component (an assumption the court found difficult to ac-
cept), the issuer's disclosure of "all the information an investor would need to perform a valuation" 
was "flatly inconsistent with an intent to mislead investors." The Tenth Circuit found scienter allega-
tions inadequate in a case where plaintiffs alleged that an issuer failed to footnote its ownership tables 
to disclose a CEO's pledge of stock, but the CEO disclosed, in Rule 144 and Form 4 filings, that his 
pledged stock was sold to meet margin calls. In re ZAGG, Inc. Sec. Litig., 797 F.3d 1194, 1197, 
1198-99, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2015) 
469. 778 F.3d 228, 231-32 (1st Cir. 2015) 
4 70. Id. at 233. 
4 71. Id. at 232-33. 
4 72. Id. at 233. 
4 73. Id. at 232-33. 
4 74. Id. at 233. An Untitled Letter addresses "regulatory violations that do not meet the threshold 
for regulatory significance warranting a Warning Letter." Id. 
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claims, the company stated that it would revise its promotional materials, had 
enhanced its review of promotional materials, and had made other changes. 475 
The FDA told Abiomed on April 20, 2010, that the company's "'response ap-
pear[ed] adequate' and that no further action was necessary."476 Abiomed did 
not disclose this regulatory exchange. 477 
On June 10, 2011, the FDA sent Abiomed a formal Warning Letter, complain-
ing that the company's "marketing materials continued to improperly compare 
the Impella 2.5 to the IABP and promote the device for non-cleared uses."478 
The FDA posted this letter on its website. 479 Abiomed conducted a "clarification 
call" with the FDA in July, then formally responded in August that it would pull 
the advertisement to which the FDA objected, remove from its website materials 
relating to a medical conference at which the company claimed that the Impella 
2.5 could improve cardiac output in AMI shock patients, and implement a plan 
to prevent further violations. 480 In April 2012, the FDA told Abiomed that the 
company was still engaged in improper marketing-referring among other 
things to videos on the Abiomedimpella YouTube channel, which discussed un-
approved uses of the Impella 2.5, a link on the Abiomed website to "Patient 
Stories" about unapproved uses of the pump, and comments by the Abiomed 
CEO during a Mad Money appearance suggesting that the Impella 2.5 could 
be used during heart attacks. 481 Following an August 7, 2012, meeting between 
Abiomed and the FDA, the FDA conducted a compliance audit at the company, 
and Abiomed simultaneously conducted its own internal audit.482 On August 20, 
2012, Abiomed wrote a letter to the FDA saying "that it understood its prior ap-
proach to compliance was 'too narrow in focus' and so was 'adopting a broad, sys-
temic approach to address the issues raised by [the] FDA,"' and that the company 
was "destroy[ing] the Impella marketing brochures cited by [the] FDA, stopp[ing] 
distribution of all marketing labeling, recall[ing] all marketing labeling held by 
Abiomed field personnel, and stopp[ing] any planned updates to all labeling 
and the [Abiomed] website."483 
On November 1, 2012, Abiomed disclosed the FDA compliance audit and an 
investigation by a U.S. Attorney into Abiomed's advertising and promotions. 484 
The company's stock price dropped by thirty-two percent. 485 By a February 19, 
4 75. Id. at 233-34. 
476. Id. at 234 (quoting FDA letter). 
477. Id. 
4 78. Id. (quoting FDA letter). 
479. Id. A Warning Letter "is a step above an Untitled Letter in the FDA's enforcement hierarchy." 
Id. at 234. It "communicates that the FDA believes the regulated entity has committed a violation of 
regulatory significance but does not commit the FDA to taking enforcement action." Id. 
480. Id. at 234-35. 
481. Id. at 235. 
482. Id. at 236. 
483. Id. (quoting Abiomed's letter). 
484. Id. at 236-37. 
485. Id. at 237. 
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2013 close-out letter, the FDA advised Abiomed that it had taken adequate cor-
rective action, and the company's stock price subsequently recovered. 486 
Plaintiffs alleged that throughout the period from August 4, 2011, to October 31, 
2012, the defendants, among other things, made half-hearted corrective efforts to 
hold the FDA at bay while fraudulently (i) reporting revenues and earnings in press 
releases, conference calls, and SEC filings, without disclosing that the company 
produced those financial results by improper promotional activities,487 and (ii) rep-
resenting that it had a policy against off-label marketing, and that it was 
cooperating with the FDA, while the company was actually engaging in wide-
spread management-directed off-label marketing and promotion.488 Affirming dis-
missal of the complaint, the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs had failed to plead 
facts supporting a strong inference of scienter.489 
As to the alleged fraud in reporting the financial results without connecting 
them to illegal marketing, the First Circuit noted the connection between mate-
riality and scienter-in particular that, "[i]f it is questionable whether a fact is 
material or its materiality is marginal, that tends to undercut the argument 
that defendants acted with the requisite intent or extreme recklessness in not 
disclosing the fact. "490 In Abiomed, the plaintiffs did "not state or even suggest 
what proportion of sales were made as a result of [prohibited promotional] ef-
forts, or the significance of the contribution of those sales to Abiomed's stock 
price," so that "[t] he marginal materiality of the alleged statements and omissions 
concerning revenues weighs against an argument that defendants . . possessed 
the requisite scienter."491 Moreover, "Abiomed explicitly warned investors both 
(a) that the FDA might disagree with the company's assessment of the legality 
of its marketing practices and (b) that, if the FDA took enforcement action 
against [Abiomed], that 'could result in reduced demand for our products and 
would have a material adverse effect on our operations and prospects."'492 
Also weighing against a scienter inference were that the company "did not with-
hold information about the FDA's concerns once the FDA issued a Warning Let-
ter" and "stated repeatedly throughout the Class Period that the FDA 'could dis-
486. Id. 
487. Id. 
488. Id. at 237-38 (with plaintiffs pointing to representations in passages contained in 10-Qs and 
a 10-K quoted at 238). 
489. Id. at 231-32, 24 7. 
490. Id. at 242 (quoting City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters Corp., 
632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011)) 
491. Id. at 24 3. The court noted that it would have to indulge a series of inferences to find that the 
improper marketing materially affected revenues and earnings-that a substantial proportion of the 
company's total revenues derived from sale of the Impella 2.5 as opposed to other Impella products; 
that a substantial proportion of Impella 2.5 sales resulted from sales of that pump for off-label use; 
that a substantial portion of the Impella 2.5 sales for off-label use resulted from improper off-label 
marketing; and that those sales were "substantial enough to have a material effect on the stock 
price." Id. at 242-43. For another 2015 decision relating materiality to scienter, see supra notes 
296-311 and accompanying text. 
492. Abiomed, Inc., 778 F.3d at 24 3 (quoting Abiomed's 10-K, filed on June 4, 2012); see id. at 238 
(quoting Abiomed's SEC filings more fully). 
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agree [with Abiomed's position that its marketing was lawful] and conclude that 
[it had] engaged in off-label promotion."'493 Those were "not the actions of a 
company bent on deceiving investors as to future earnings prospects. "494 
Turning to the alleged fraud through deceptive statements that the company 
had a policy against off-label marketing and that it was cooperating with the 
FDA, the First Circuit focused on the defendants' careful wording in public state-
ments, where Abiomed said that "its policy was to 'refrain from statements that 
could be considered off-label promotion,' but that the FDA could disagree with 
Abiomed's view on that question; and that, while it 'believe[d]' the issue had 
been resolved, it could come up again in the future and could entail 'significant 
consequences."'495 Thus, even if the defendants, in fact, had a policy or practice 
that generated improper off-label marketing (while they mistakenly believed the 
advertising was legal), and even if, in fact, the dispute with the FDA had not 
been resolved (while they mistakenly believed it was), those facts did not raise 
the requisite inference that the defendants lied to investors. 496 As to the state-
ments about company cooperation with the FDA, the court viewed Abiomed's 
requests to meet with the FDA and the FDA's ultimate conclusion to close out 
the off-label marketing correspondence to support the inference that the com-
pany "was not involved in a scheme to defraud investors but rather in finding 
a solution amenable to the FDA while meeting its need to market its products."497 
Significance and analysis. Abiomed contains some very issuer-friendly language. 
In particular, the First Circuit rejected the notion that the company "should have 
affirmatively admitted widespread wrongdoing rather than stating that the out-
come of its regulatory back-and-forth with the FDA was uncertain."498 The 
court posited that "[t]here must be some room for give and take between a reg-
ulated entity and its regulator."499 Moreover, the court parsed the company's 
statements in a manner quite favorable to the defendants, emphasizing that 
the company said that the FDA might disagree with the company's conclusion 
that its marketing was within legal limits and that, while the company believed 
at one point that it had resolved the matter with the agency, the matter might sur-
face again. Note, however, that the court of appeals provided all of this defendant-
supportive prose against the backdrop of the FDA ultimately having decided that 
493. Id. at 24 3 (quoting a statement, some version of which appeared in Abiomed's 10-Qs for the 
first, second, and third quarters of 2012); see id. at 238 (quoting Abiomed's SEC filings more fully). 
494. Id. at 243. 
495. Id. at 244 (quoting a statement, some version of which appeared in Abiomed's 10-Qs for the 
first, second, and third quarters of 2012); see id. at 238 (quoting Abiomed's SEC filings more fully). 
496. Id. at 244. Indeed, the First Circuit assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that Abiomed had a 
policy or practice that in fact produced improper off-label promotion. Id. 
497. Id. The court added that Abiomed's statements about its device were aimed at customers and 
not investors. Id. at 245. Moreover, the First Circuit brushed aside the complaint's reference to con-
fidential witness statements, noting that some of those witnesses had not worked at Abiomed during 
the class period and others failed to provide the time period to which their statements referred. Id. 
The court found their statements collectively "undermined by the fact that the FDA eventually closed 
out its investigation of Abiomed without taking any action adverse to the company." Id. 
498. Id. at 244. 
499. Id. 
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Abiomed had done enough to warrant closing out its off-label marketing concerns 
without imposing any penalty. 50° Companies should not assume that courts will 
take this approach in a case where the agency ultimately sanctions the issuer. In 
those cases, defendants can expect much closer scrutiny of whether the public re-
presentations of law-abiding behavior had a substantial basis and whether any 
qualifications deliberately created an impression that the government scrutiny was 
not as serious as it was. 
Omissions of negative information from summaries of FDA communications. Chel-
sea Therapeutics International, Ltd. ("Chelsea") conducted four clinical studies 
of a drug to treat neurogenic orthostatic hypotension, which results from low 
blood pressure when a person stands up, producing dizziness and weakness. 501 
Chelsea labeled the studies 301, 302, 303, and 306. 502 Chelsea began the 301 
and 302 studies in 2008. 503 The complaint alleged that the 302 study failed 
to show a statistically significant effect on lightheadedness and dizziness and 
that the 303 study did not meet its endpoint and failed to demonstrate any 
"duration effect" on symptoms. 504 The company halted the 306 study after an 
interim analysis suggested that it would not meet its endpoint. sos The case cen-
tered on Chelsea's efforts to win approval for its drug through the 301 study, 
supplemented with data from the 302 study. 
After Chelsea announced the 302 study results to investors and agreed, in 
November 2009, with the FDA to modify the assessment scale for the ongoing 
301 study, the company stated in September 2010 that the 301 study had dem-
onstrated statistically significant improvement in participants' symptoms. 506 The 
special protocol assessment for the 301 study "stated that the FDA expected two 
successful efficacy studies before it would grant regulatory approval of the new 
drug."507 The FDA told Chelsea, in a meeting on December 10, 2010, "that a 
single successful study typically was not sufficient to support approval of a 
new drug."508 Nonetheless, Chelsea announced that the FDA had "agreed" 
that Chelsa, without any further studies, could submit a new drug application 
on the basis of the 301 study, together with data from the 302 study. 509 More-
over, on a conference call with investors, Chelsea's CEO characterized the 
December 10 meeting with the FDA as a "'successful outcome' that 'reflect[ed] 
the strength of the data,"' reaffirming in the same call "that the FDA officials 
had clarified 'that additional efficacy studies were not required' for a new drug 
application filing. "510 
500. Id. at 237, 245. 
501. Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int'!, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 601 (4th Cir. 2015). 
502. Id. 
503. Id. 
504. Id. at 601-02. 
505. Id. at 602. 
506. Id. 
507. Id. at 601-02. 
508. Id. at 602. 
509. Id. at 602, 614 (quoting press release). 
510. Id. at 602 (quoting CEO). 
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After Chelsea submitted its new drug application, an FDA staffer prepared a 
briefing document for the FDA's Cardiovascular and Renal Drugs Advisory Com-
mittee in which the staffer recommended against approval in part because the 
application did not show a "durable effect (i.e., more than 4 weeks)."511 On Feb-
ruary 13, 2012, Chelsea issued a press release stating that the briefing document 
raised "several lines of inquiry ... as [to] significant components of the benefit-
risk analysis of [the drug]" because the evidence that Chelsea submitted to the 
FDA "'may not adequately establish a durable treatment effect as a result of 
the short duration of' the clinical trials."512 The press release did not disclose, 
however, that the briefing document recommended against approving the 
drug. 513 The FDA made the document available on its website eight days after 
Chelsea issued its press release. 514 Chelsea's stock price declined after the press 
release and again after the FDA released the briefing document. 515 On February 
23, 2012, the FDA advisory committee announced that it recommended approv-
ing the drug, although virtually all members concluded that the failed studies did 
not provide "confirmatory evidence of benefit[ a]nd ... [the] 301 [Study] also did 
not provide evidence regarding the duration of effect in any direct way."516 The 
FDA denied the drug application on March 28, 2012.517 
On behalf of all those who bought Chelsea stock between November 3, 2008, 
and March 28, 2012, the plaintiffs brought a Rule lOb-5 case against Chelsea 
and four executives. 518 Vacating and remanding the district court's dismissal, 
the Fourth Circuit focused on whether the complaint alleged facts raising a 
strong inference that the defendants (i) "intentionally or recklessly failed to dis-
close that the FDA expected Chelsea to produce two successful studies showing 
evidence of durability of effect," and (ii) "intentionally misled investors in the 
February 13, 2012, press release, by failing to disclose that the FDA briefing 
document included a recommendation against approval."519 Taking the allega-
tions of the complaint as true for purposes of evaluating the dismissal below, 
the Fourth Circuit concluded that, even if Chelsea's announcement after the De-
cember 10, 2010, meeting with the FDA correctly stated that the FDA could sub-
mit a new drug application based on one completed study that showed efficacy, 
Chelsea's announcement "was misleading given the FDA's continuing expecta-
tion that two successful efficacy studies would be required for approval of 
[the drug]. "520 In addition, the complaint alleged that "Chelsea was aware of 
Study 301 and Study 302's durational-benefit shortcomings. "521 Further, the 
511. Id. at 603 (quoting briefing document). 




516. Id. (quoting advisory committee chair). 
517. Id. 
518. Id. at 600 n.l, 603. 
519. Id. at 608, 611. 
520. Id. at 609. 
521. Id. (quoting complaint). 
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omission of the adverse FDA staffer's recommendation in Chelsea's description 
of the pre-advisory committee briefing "when viewed in the context of the 
known problems of the efficacy studies and Chelsea's earlier remarks regarding 
those studies, supports the inference that Chelsea intentionally or recklessly mis-
led investors."522 Together, the allegations "permit[ted] a strong inference that 
the defendants either knowingly or recklessly misled investors by failing to dis-
close critical information received from the FDA during the new drug applica-
tion process, while releasing less damaging information that they knew was 
incomplete. "523 
Significance and analysis. Chelsea was a two-to-one decision, with the dissent 
pointing out that (i) federal law expressly permits the FDA to approve a drug 
based on a single study;524 (ii) the CEO stated in a December 2010 conference 
call "that the FDA had expressed an interest in seeing 'two additional stud-
ies'";525 and (iii) Chelsea did not depend solely on the 301 study when submit-
ting its application for drug approval but also on supplemental data from the 302 
study. 526 The dissent also noted that (i) Chelsea set out in a September 30, 2011, 
quarterly report "numerous reasons why the FDA 'may not accept or approve' the 
[drug] application";527 and (ii) Chelsea warned in its press release describing 
the pre-advisory committee briefing that the briefing raised questions regarding 
the drug's benefit-risk analysis. 528 The most important message from the majority 
opinion therefore is that even specific warnings like these may not suffice where 
a drug or device company (i) describes a communication with, or analysis from, 
the FDA, such as the briefing document that Chelsea obtained before the FDA 
made it public, but (ii) fails to include in the description particular adverse com-
ments that the FDA made in that very communication or analysis, such as the brief-
ing paper's recommendation against drug approval.529 
Imputation of officer scienter to corporation. In re ChinaCast Education Corp. Se-
curities Litigation provided the Ninth Circuit with the opportunity to address im-
putation of scienter from a corporate officer to a corporate defendant. 530 The 
complaint included a Rule lOb-5 claim against ChinaCast Education Corpora-
tion based on assurances from its CEO-while he was looting the company 
522. Id. at 610. 
523 Id. 
524. Id. at 614 (Thacker,]., dissenting) ("[F]ederal law expressly authorizes the FDA to make the 
requisite finding of 'substantial evidence' based solely on 'data from one adequate and well-controlled 
clinical investigation and confirmatory evidence (obtained prior to or after such investigation .... ") 
(quoting 21 USC § 355(d) (2012))) 
525. Id. at 615 (quoting CEO). 
526. Id. at 614-15. 
527. Id. at 615 (quoting quarterly report). 
528. Id. 
529. In one other life sciences case last year, the Third Circuit found scienter allegations insuffi-
cient where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants recklessly disregarded (i) an asserted FDA re-
quirement that results from a clinical test meet a particular p statistic test and (ii) an asserted need 
to show statistical significance in results from a U.S. subgroup alone. In re Columbia Labs., Inc., 
Sec. Litig., 602 F. App'x 80, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2015). 
530. 809 F.3d 471, 472 (9th Cir. 2015) 
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by, among other things, transferring $120 million of assets to accounts that he 
and his allies controlled-that the company enjoyed financial health and stability 
and that "no questions or concern[s] have ever been raised by the company's au-
ditors or audit committee about [the company's] cash balances."531 The com-
plaint also alleged that the CEO committed fraud by signing SEC filings for 
the company without disclosing his defalcations. 532 The district court dismissed 
the case, holding that the CEO's scienter could not be imputed to the corpora-
tion because the CEO had been acting adversely to the corporation, to benefit 
himself rather than to benefit the corporation in any way. 533 
In reversing,534 the Ninth Circuit reprised that, "[i]n the context of Rule lOb-5, 
[it had] adopted the general rule of imputation and held that a corporation is re-
sponsible for a corporate officer's fraud committed 'within the scope of his em-
ployment' or 'for a misleading statement made by an employee or other agent 
who has actual or apparent authority."'535 While not disputing that the CEO 
had "acted within the scope of his apparent authority," the corporation relied 
on the "adverse interest" exception to the rule that an agent's state of mind is im-
puted to a principal-an exception by which "a rogue agent's ... knowledge [is] 
'not imputed to the principal if the agent acts adversely to the principal in a trans-
action or matter, intending to act solely for the agent's own purposes or those of 
another person."'536 The Ninth Circuit, however, invoked the exception to this ex-
ception, namely that "the adverse interest rule collapses in the face of an innocent 
third party who relies on the agent's apparent authority."537 Here, the complaint 
pled facts sufficient to impute the CEO's scienter to the corporation because the 
complaint "allege[d] that third-party shareholders understandably relied on [the 
CEO's] representations, which were made with the imprimatur of the corporation 
that selected him to speak on its behalf and sign SEC filings. "538 
Significance and analysis. Circuit decisions seem to converge on the rule that in a 
Rule lOb-5 case corporate scienter requires scienter on the part of the individuals 
inside the corporation who, acting within their authority, author or speak the chal-
lenged statements.539 If such an individual had scienter and spoke or wrote with 
even apparent authority of the company, it seems unlikely, in light of ChinaCast, 
that the company can defend on the basis that the individual was not seeking by 
the fraud to benefit the company but only to put money into his or her own pocket. 
531. Id. at 473 (quoting press release and conference call from fall 2011) (first alteration by ap-
pellate court). 
532. Id. 
533. Id. at 474. 
534. Id. at 473, 479. 
535. Id. at 476 (quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.28 (9th Cir. 
1990) (en bane)). 
536. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 5.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)). The court of appeals 
noted that "this is a question of federal securities law, albeit one guided by (common law) agency 
principles." Id. at 475 n.4. 
537. Id. at 477. 
538. Id. 
539. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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Scienter does not require intent to harm. While scienter includes intent to de-
ceive or severe recklessness with respect to deception, 540 the Second Circuit 
held in United States v. Litvak that proof of scienter does not require intent to 
harm. 541 Although Litvak case was a criminal prosecution, scienter is an element 
common to both government enforcement actions542 and private Rule lOb-5 
lawsuits. 543 Therefore the holding should apply to both. 
PRIMARY VIOLATION OF RULE 10b-5(b) 
Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security in interstate commerce, "(a) [t] o employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. "544 In ]anus Capital 
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the Supreme Court held that only "the per-
son or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content 
and whether and how to communicate it" "make[s]" a statement for purposes 
of subsection (b). 545 Because there is no aiding and abetting liability in a private 
Rule lOb-5 action, Janus means that only "maker[s]" of a statement can be liable 
in a private action brought under subsection (b). 546 
In ]anus, the Court held that an investment adviser did not "make" the state-
ments in prospectuses for mutual funds it managed because the funds, rather 
than the adviser, had ultimate authority over the content and dissemination of 
the prospectuses. 547 In reaching that conclusion, the Court observed that the 
business trust containing the funds was a separate legal entity from the adviser 
540. See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text. 
541. 808 F.3d 160, 179 (2d Cir. 2015) ('"[I]ntent to harm' is not a component of the scienter el-
ement of securities fraud under Section lO(b) .... ").The Second Circuit distinguished mail fraud. Id. 
at 178-79; see supra notes 312-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Litvak case generally). 
Further as to scienter, the trial court had instructed the jury: "if you find that Mr. Litvak acted in 
good faith, or held an honest belief that his actions (as charged in a given count) were proper and not 
in furtherance of any unlawful activity, you cannot convict him of that count." Litvak, 808 F.3d at 189 
(quoting jury instruction). The lower court permitted Mr. Litvak "to adduce evidence that his super-
visors 'approved' or 'encouraged' him to misrepresent price, cost, or a seller's identity" as that could 
cut against a conclusion that he intended to defraud. Id. at 188 (quoting joint appendix). The district 
court, however, excluded evidence "of Jefferies managers', including Litvak's supervisors, knowledge 
or approval of other employees' similar conduct" on the ground that such evidence would "improperly 
'suggest that everybody did it and therefore it isn't illegal."' Id. (quoting joint appendix); id. at 189-90 
& n.35 (quoting district court) (emphasis by appellate court). The Second Circuit held this exclusion 
"exceeded [the district court's] allowable discretion," as this testimony was relevant to intent to de-
fraud "under the low threshold set ... by Federal Rule of Evidence 401." Id. at 190. 
542. Id. at 178. 
54 3. Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). 
544. 17 CFR. § 240.lOb-5 (2015) 
545. 131 s Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) 
546. Id. at 2302. Plaintiffs can pursue others as "control persons." Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) 
(2012) 
54 7. ]anus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304. 
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and had an independent board. s4s The Court therefore left open whether the 
rule it announced in Janus would apply when the defendant was not a separate 
legal entity but an officer of a corporation issuing an allegedly fraudulent 
statement. 
In Glichenhaus & Co. v. Household International, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held 
that Janus does apply to individuals inside a company.s49 The misstatements con-
cerned lending practices, delinquency rates, and earnings from credit-card agree-
ments. sso A jury found the corporation and three individual defendants (the 
CEO, the CFO, and the vice-chair and president of consumer lending) liable 
after a trial.ssi The company stipulated that it had "made" all of the challenged 
statements in its SEC filings and press releases, and the Seventh Circuit held that 
the corporate defendant also made the "statements delivered by the three exec-
utives" because "[n]othing in Janus undid the longstanding rule that '[a] corpo-
ration is liable for statements by employees who have apparent authority to make 
them."'ss2 
The trial court, however, instructed the jury that it could also hold an individ-
ual defendant liable on a statement if the plaintiffs "proved that the [individual] 
defendant 'made, approved, or furnished information to be included in a false state-
ment'" and denied a new trial motion that the individual defendants based on the 
then-recent ]anus opinion, reasoning that ]anus "applied only to legally indepen-
dent third parties . , not to corporate insiders. "ss3 The Seventh Circuit ruled 
"[t]hat was error" and held that "[n]othing in Janus limits its holding to legally 
independent third parties," so that "[t]he instruction plainly misstated the 
law. "ss4 The circuit court then proceeded to apply ]anus to the three executives. 
The CEO conceded that he had "made" the statements in the company's SEC 
filings and his own presentation to Goldman Sachs.sss This left open whether he 
"made" statements in the company's press releases. Because no evidence showed 
that the CEO signed the press releases or that his "name appeared in the press 
releases in the sense of an attribution" or that the CEO "actually delivered the 
statements in the press releases himself-say, for example, by reading them at 
a press conference"-the court of appeals held that the CEO was entitled to a 
new trial for his liability for those statements. ss6 At that trial, plaintiffs would 
have to prove that the CEO "actually exercised control over the content of the 
press releases and whether and how they were communicated," which is "an in-
548. Id. at 2299. 
549. 787 F.3d 408, 424-29 (7th Cir. 2015) 
550. Id. at 413. 
551. Id. at 412, 426. 
552. Id. at 426 (quoting Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 
2008)); id. at 413 (holding that the corporate defendant "itself 'made' all the false statements, as ]anus 
defined that term"). 
553. Id. at 425 (quoting jury instructions) (emphasis by appellate court). 
554. Id. 
555. Id. at 426. 
556. Id. at 426-27. 
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herently fact-bound inquiry."557 The court, however, held that the CEO was not 
prejudiced by the faulty instruction insofar as he was held liable for a false state-
ment made by the vice-chairman/president of consumer lending because the 
CEO had "drafted the statement" and sent it to other executives with an email 
saying: "Attached ... is our media holding statement."558 The vice-chair/president 
of consumer lending "simply read the statement verbatim to the media."559 Be-
cause "the CEO [was] the actual author of the statement, [he] had the 'ultimate 
authority' over its content and whether and how to communicate it, the touch-
stone of ]anus. "560 Accordingly, he could be liable for the statement, as could 
the vice-chair/president of consumer lending too, as "[n]othing injanus precludes 
a single statement from having multiple makers. "561 
The CFO also conceded that he "made" the statements in an SEC filing and in 
his own presentation at an investor relations conference. 562 He, too, however 
was entitled to a new trial on liability for statements in the press releases, 
under the same actual control standard applicable to the CE0. 563 The vice-
chair/president of consumer lending was liable for the one statement that he 
read to the media himself, but was entitled to a new trial on his liability for state-
ments in the SEC filings and press releases. 564 
DAMAGES, Loss CAUSATION, AND RELIANCE IN OPEN 
MARKET CASES565 
Plaintiffs in a private Rule lOb-5 action must prove reliance, economic loss 
(damages), and loss causation. 566 The three elements interact in an open market 
case because plaintiffs prove them all through the effect of misstatements and 
corrective disclosures on securities prices. 567 Two opinions dealt with that inter-
action in 2015. The Seventh Circuit set out a rule that, where the plaintiff is 
proving loss causation and damages by a model that computes the amount of 
inflation based on the difference between actual returns and returns estimated 
by the relationship between the stock price at issue and market or industry in-
557. Id. at 42 7. The court commented that it was "hesitant to hold as a matter of law that a CEO 
'makes' all statements contained in a company press release, as that term was narrowly defined in 
]anus." Id. at 426. 
558. Id. at 427 (first quoting appellate court; then quoting CEO's email). 
559. Id. 
560. Id. (quoting Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 
(2011)) 
561. Id. 
562. Id. at 428. 
563. Id. 
564. Id. 
565. In a decision involving a face-to-face transaction, rather than open market trading, the Sixth 
Circuit held that a plaintiff's reliance on misrepresentations was unjustified where the plaintiff did 
not read the relevant documents before signing them and those documents provided the truth. 
Bender v. Logan, 608 F. App'x 356, 360-63 (6th Cir. 2015). 
566. Dura Pharms. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005); see also 15 U.5.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) 
(2012) (requiring that private plaintiff prove loss causation). 
567. See William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do justice in a Time of Mad-
ness7, 54 EMORY LJ. 843, 874-83 (2005). 
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dices, the model may go to a jury if the plaintiff's expert testifies in noncon-
clusory terms that no company-specific non-fraud information influenced the 
calculations, shifting the burden of identifying such information to the defense, 
after which-if the defense presents such information-the burden shifts backs 
to the plaintiff to account for that information. 568 In the same case, the Seventh 
Circuit approved protocols by which a district court, following trial of class-wide 
issues, provided the defendants with an opportunity to test whether individual 
members of the class relied on the integrity of the market. 569 The Fifth Circuit 
found no abuse in the certification of one class in the Gulf oil spill securities 
case, holding that any quarrel over whether particular disclosures were "correc-
tive" raised questions common to the class, and found no abuse in denial of cer-
tification of a second class, in which recovery depended on whether individual 
class members would have purchased the issuer's securities at all if they had 
known the risk created by the company's unpreparedness to deal with a deep 
water blowout. 570 
In Glichenhaus & Co. v. Household International, Inc., the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed both reliance and loss causation in a rare case that was tried to a jury 
verdict, resulting in a $2.46 billion judgment. 571 The court of appeals ordered 
a new trial on loss causation, but found no error in the lower court's treatment 
of reliance. 572 
Loss causation when the truth leahs out over time. Plaintiffs alleged that the cor-
porate defendant and its executives had inflated the price of the Household In-
ternational, Inc. ("Household") stock by making false statements about the com-
pany's lending practices, the delinquency rates on loans it had made, and its 
earnings from credit-card agreements. 573 The jury found seventeen actionable 
misrepresentations. 57 4 
Loss causation required the plaintiffs to prove "that the price of the securities 
they purchased was 'inflated'"-with "the best way to determine the impact of a 
false statement" on price being "to observe what happens when the truth is fi-
nally disclosed and use that to work backward, on the assumption that the 
lie's positive effect on the share price is equal to the additive inverse of the truth's 
negative effect. "575 The plaintiffs' expert presented two different economic mod-
els with which to accomplish that task. 576 The jury selected the "leakage" model, 
which assumed that the truth leaked out over the class period, and calculated the 
568. See infra notes 575-90 and accompanying text (discussing loss causation and burden shift-
ing); see also infra notes 571-604 and accompanying text (discussing the case generally). 
569. See infra notes 591-604 and accompanying text (discussing rebuttal of presumption of reli-
ance); see also infra notes 571-604 (discussing the case generally). 
570. See infra notes 605-28 and accompanying text. 
571. 787 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) 
572. Id. at 433. The Seventh Circuit also ordered a new trial on the responsibility of individual 
defendants for certain company statements. See supra notes 544-64 and accompanying text. 
573. Glichenhaus, 787 F .3d at 413. 
574. Id. at 414. 
575. Id. at 415. 
576. Id. at 415-16 
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inflation caused by the fraud, on each trading day, as the difference (called the 
"residual") between the actual Household stock price on that day and the price 
for that day as predicted by a regression analysis built on the relationship be-
tween the historical movement of Household's stock price and the movement 
of the S&P 500 and the S&P 500 Financials lndex. 577 Using this model, the 
"amount the stock is overpriced on any given day is the sum of all subsequent 
residual returns. "578 Thus, because the residuals totaled $23. 94, that was the 
amount by which the stock was overpriced on the first day of the fraud, with 
that amount declining as the truth leaked out and the price of the company's 
stock fell lower relative to the two indices. 579 
On appeal, the defendants attacked the leakage model in three ways. First, 
they argued that, because the stock price on the first day of the fraud increased 
by only $3.40/share and the regression analysis reflected a residual on that day of 
only $0.67, the fraud could not possibly have inflated the price of the stock by 
$23.94 at that time. 580 The court rejected this argument because the question 
was not the amount by which the first fraudulent statement increased the 
price of the stock but the price to which the stock would have fallen if the 
full truth had been known on the first day. 581 
The defendants' second argument fared better. They pointed out that the re-
gression analysis controlled only for general market trends (by using the S&P 
500 index) and industry-specific trends (by using the S&P 500 Financials 
Index) but not for nonfraudulent company-specific news. 582 The plaintiffs' ex-
pert testified generally that "he looked for company-specific factors during the 
relevant period and did not find any significant trend of positive or negative in-
formation apart from the fraud-related disclosures. "583 The defendants con-
tended that this was inadequate and that the plaintiffs needed to affirmatively 
"eliminate any firm-specific, nonfraud related factors that might have contrib-
uted to the stock's decline."584 Noting that the defendants did not identify any 
such information that "could have significantly distorted the [plaintiffs'] 
model,"585 the Seventh Circuit provided the following rule: 
577. Id. at 416-17. The Financials Index was relevant because Household's "business centered on 
consumer lending-mortgages, home-equity loans, auto financing, and credit-card loans." Id. at 413. 
578. Id. at 416. 
579. Id. at 416-17. 
580. Id. at 417. 
581. Id. at 417-18. The court reasoned: 
As soon as the first false statement was made, that overpricing became fully attributable to the 
false statement, even if the stock price didn't change at all, because had the statement been truth-
ful, the price would have gone down by $23.94-after all, that's what it did once the truth was 
fully revealed . 
Id. at 417-18; see also id. at 419 (noting that a false statement that does not raise the price of stock, 
but keeps it at an inflated level, can cause loss). 
582. Id. at 419. 
583. Id. 
584. Id. at 420. 
585. Id. at 422. 
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If the plaintiffs' expert testifies that no firm-specific, nonfraud related information 
contributed to the decline in stock price during the relevant time period and ex-
plains in nonconclusory terms the basis for this opinion, then it's reasonable to 
expect the defendants to shoulder the burden of identifying some significant, 
firm-specific, nonfraud related information that could have affected the stock 
price. If they can't, then the leakage model can go to the Jury; if they can, then 
the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to account for that specific information or 
provide a loss-causation model that doesn't suffer from the same problem . 
One possible way to address the issue is to simply exclude from the model's calcu-
lation any days identified by the defendants on which significant, firm-specific, non-
fraud related information was released. 586 
Because the leakage model did not account for the possibility that firm-specific, 
nonfraudulent information affected the defendant company's stock price, and 
because "the expert's general statement that any such information was insignif-
icant . [was] not enough," the court ordered a new trial on the issue of loss 
causation, to be conducted according to the rule set out above. 587 
Third and finally, the defendants argued that the leakage model purported to 
prove loss caused by all three categories of misrepresentations (lending practices, 
delinquency rates, and earnings from credit-card agreements), while the first 
misstatement dealt only with lending practices. 588 The court of appeals sug-
gested that this problem be solved by "instruct[ing] the jurors that if the first ac-
tionable misrepresentation relates only to one or two of the three categories of 
fraud, they should find zero inflation in the stock (or some fraction of the 
model they've chosen) until there are actionable misrepresentations addressing 
all three." 589 
Significance and analysis. Much of the Glichenhaus reasoning seems confused 
because the court fails to separate loss causation from damages. Properly ana-
lyzed, loss causation requires only that the fraud caused loss, while damages fo-
cuses on the amount of loss caused by the fraud. Accordingly, a plaintiff proves 
loss causation by showing that the fraud was a substantial reason for the plain-
tiff's loss, even if other factors also contributed. A plaintiff, however, can recover 
damages attributable to the fraud alone and so must, for damages proof, show 
the loss that he or she suffered after isolating and removing any loss appropri-
ately attributed to other factors. 590 The doctrinal mixup is important. Plaintiffs 
have the burden of proof on both elements. Thus, on damages, plaintiffs must 
prove the amount of price inflation caused by the fraud on each day of the class pe-
riod. The court's rule may effectively create a damages presumption in favor of an 
expert model that the defendants must refute, thus disturbing the proof burden. 
Rebutting the reliance presumption in the second phase of a fraud-on-the-market 
case. The Glichenhaus trial court divided the case into two phases, with the 
586. Id. at 422-23. 
587. Id. at 423. 
588. Id. 
589. Id. at 424. 
590. See Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 F.3d 223, 228-33 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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first devoted to questions common to the plaintiff class, and the second address-
ing reliance issues for individual class members by permitting the defense to 
rebut a class-wide reliance presumption. 591 The plaintiffs invoked the fraud-
on-the-market ("FOTM") presumption that stock purchasers rely on misstate-
ments, even if those purchasers never hear or read them, because the purchasers 
rely on the integrity of the market prices that impound the information made 
public in those misstatements. 592 The presumption can be rebutted by "[a]ny 
showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either 
the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair mar-
ket price."593 The district court determined that-in the second phase here-the 
only method of rebuttal available to the defense was that "individual plaintiffs 
bought or sold Household stock without relying on the integrity of the mar-
ket."594 Accordingly, the judge required each class member to answer a written 
question asking whether the class member would still have purchased the stock 
if the member had known that defendants' false statements had inflated the 
price. 595 When some members failed to respond, the court allowed the plaintiffs 
to send out the question again.596 The judge also permitted defendants to depose 
up to fifteen class members (the defendants deposed twelve) and to serve written 
discovery (which defendants sent to about 100 class members) asking about 
trading strategies and any nonpublic information on which those class members 
relied. 597 Almost 11,000 class members answered "no" to the court's ques-
tion. 598 The trial court entered judgment for each of those class members, pro-
vided that (i) discovery had produced no evidence inconsistent with the answer 
and (ii) the class member's claim exceeded $250,000. 599 Those were the judg-
ments subject to the appeal. 600 
On the appeal, the defendants objected to that process,601 arguing that "class 
members should have been asked whether they would have transacted if they 
had known that the statements were false. "602 The Seventh Circuit rejected 
this view because investors who might have purchased if they had known that 
the defendants' statements were false might not have purchased if they also 
591. Glichenhaus, 787 F.3d at 413-14. 
592. Id. at 429. 
593. Id. (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. john Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014) (quot-
ing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988) (plurality))). 
594. Id. at 4 30. The trial judge concluded that other avenues of rebutting the FOTM presumption-
either showing that market makers were aware of the truth or that the truth had entered the market and 
dissipated the effects of the falsehoods-"had already been rejected by the jury in Phase!." Id. 
595. Id. 




600. Id. at 414, 4 31 n.14. The defendants were entitled to judgment against class members who 
(i) failed to answer the court's question either time it was sent out and (ii) had claims exceeding 
$250,000. Id. at 431. About 30,000 claims had not been resolved. Id. at 431-32. 
601. Id. at 4 32. 
602. Id. (emphasis deleted). 
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had known that those statements had inflated the price that the investors would 
have to pay. 603 To defendants further point that the court's question was "mean-
ingless" because "all class members could see how they needed to respond in 
order to recover," the appellate court responded that, while the question was 
"imperfect," class members had to answer under penalty of perjury and some 
of them had answered that they would have purchased the shares even knowing 
that the defendants had inflated the price. 604 
Damages, reliance, and class certification. BP, P.L.C. ("BP") co-owned and co-
leased the Macondo exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico. 605 An April 20, 
2010 blowout at that well poured oil into the Gulf until the well was capped 
on July 15, 2010. 606 Plaintiffs brought a Rule lOb-5 action against BP and 
two executives, suing on behalf of two classes of investors: (i) those who ac-
quired BP ADS between November 8, 2007, and April 20, 2010 (the "pre-
spill class"); and (ii) those who acquired BP ADS between April 26, 2010, and 
May 28, 2010 (the "post-spill" class). 607 On a motion to certify the classes 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)-which requires "that the ques-
tions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members"608-the district court certified the post-spill 
class but denied certification to the pre-spill class, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
on Rule 23(f) review. 609 The alleged misrepresentations in the pre-spill class pe-
riod included (i) assertions that BP was implementing safety improvements recom-
mended by a commission established after an explosion at a BP refinery in Texas; 
(ii) statements about the company's Operating Management System, which the 
company said would standardize safety processes across all of its lines of business 
but which did not apply to sites such as the one at which the Gulf blowout oc-
curred; and (iii) representations in filings with regulatory agencies that BP had 
the ability and equipment to respond to a deepwater oil spill. 610 The alleged mis-
representations in the post-spill period concerned the rate at which oil was flowing 
into the Gulf at the blowout site. 611 
The plaintiffs proposed to calculate damages as the difference between the price 
paid by each purchaser and the price that the purchaser would have paid had the 
603. Id. 
604. Id. at 432-33. The court also rejected defense arguments based on discovery limitations dur-
ing the second phase. Id. at 4 32. 
605. Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2015). 
606. Id. 
607. Id. at 677 (identifying defendants); id. at 679-80 (identifying claim as brought under Rule lOb-5 
and also the classes); In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 10-md-2185, 2014 WL 2112823, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 
May 20, 2014) (providing dates for two class periods, but stating that the first date of the second class 
would begin on either April 26 or 29, depending on whether the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to 
amend); id. at *14 (stating that a third amended complaint would include an alleged misrepresentation 
on April 24 so that the start date for the second class could begin on April 26); id. at *17 (granting leave 
to amend). 
608. Fm R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3). 
609. Ludlow, 800 F.3d at 677, 680, 692. 
610. Id. at 678-79. 
611. Id. at 679. 
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misrepresentations not been made (the "true value" of the equity). 612 Turning first 
to the post-spill class, the Fifth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs' expert computed 
the true value of the equity on each day of the post-spill period by identifying six 
events that the expert concluded to have alerted the market that the spill rate was 
greater than BP represented ("corrective events"), using an event study to isolate 
the abnormal decline in BP's share price after each of these events, starting with 
the last one, then carrying the abnormal declines back through the class period 
while adjusting the amount of the price inflation after each event. 613 Using this 
model, those buying at the beginning of the post-spill class period would have 
overpaid by the total of all of the abnormal declines, those buying after the first 
corrective event and before the second corrective event would have overpaid by 
the total of all abnormal declines minus the abnormal decline after the first correc-
tive event, and so forth. 614 The defendants contended that some of the corrective 
events identified by plaintiffs' expert were not related to the alleged misrepresen-
tations about the spill rate. 615 The Fifth Circuit responded that this possibility did 
not counsel against Rule 23(b)(3) class certification because "the question of 
whether certain corrective disclosures are linked to the alleged misrepresentations 
in question is undeniably common to the class. "616 
The defendants also argued that the post-spill certification was improper be-
cause some of the corrective events concerned damages from the oil spill rather 
than alleged misrepresentations about the spill rate. 617 The Fifth Circuit agreed 
"that damages stemming from the spill itself are not recoverable under the plain-
tiffs' theory of liability"618 but held that the "tightness of th[e] fit" "between the 
corrective event and the misstatements ... is a question common to the class. "619 
Relevant to both defense arguments, the court noted that the plaintiffs' expert's 
methodology allowed for removal of any particular corrective event from the 
model (and therefore removal of the associated abnormal stock price change 
after the event) if the event was found not to correct the misrepresentation on 
which the plaintiffs sued. 620 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, because the plaintiffs could not, under Su-
preme Court authority, be required to prove loss causation in order to win 
class certification, they could not, in order to win certification, be required to 
612. Id. at 683. 
613. See id. at 683-84. 
614. See id. at 684. 
615. Id. at 687 (citing an announcement by BP that its board was meeting "to discuss alternatives 
to paying a dividend"). 




620. Id. at 688-89. 
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prove a perfect damages case. 621 Accordingly, "the district court did not err in 
refusing to resolve concerns about the inclusion of certain corrective events at 
the class certification stage. "622 
Moving to the pre-spill class, the court of appeals observed that the plaintiffs 
were proceeding on the "materialization of the risk" theory-i.e., that the de-
fendants "allegedly misstated the efficacy of its safety procedures, creating an im-
pression that the risk of a catastrophic failure was lower than it actually was . 
taking away plaintiffs' 'opportunity to decide whether to divest in light of the 
heightened risk."'623 This meant, however, that the key question was not 
whether a class member paid an inappropriately high price for the stock but 
whether the class member "would not have bought BP stock at all were it not 
for the alleged misrepresentations-a determination not derivable as a common 
question, but rather one requiring individualized inquiry. "624 The plaintiffs' ex-
pert offered no "mechanism for separating" those class members who would not 
have bought if the market had known of the higher-than-represented risk from 
those class members who would have purchased anyway. 625 While the plaintiffs 
argued that the FOTM presumption removed these individual questions, the 
Fifth Circuit responded that "[t]he [FOTM] theory does not provide any pre-
sumptions with regard to loss causation-whether the misstatement caused 
the loss. And here, where the economic loss depends on the posture of the plain-
tiff vis-a-vis risk tolerance, that loss causation, and thus damage, cannot be pre-
sumed nor can it be found class-wide."626 
Significance and analysis. The BP decision merits two comments. First, it re-
minds us that proof of damages-in a securities class action lawsuit where plain-
tiffs rely on the FOTM presumption and seek out-of-pocket damages627 -
requires two steps: (i) determination of the price at which the stock would 
have traded absent the asserted fraud and (ii) submission by individual class 
members of claims proving their purchases during the period of the fraud. 
While the second obviously raises individual questions that do not prevent 
class certification, class certification is dependent on a common way to prove 
the first. 
Second, doctrinally, the court seems to lose its way when discussing the pre-
spill class. The court's analysis seems to center not on loss causation or damages 
but reliance-proof of the facts on which the plaintiff class members relied in 
621. Id. at 687-88 (citing Erica P. john Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 
(2011)) 
622. Id. at 688. The Fifth Circuit said, at the outset of its analysis, that it was reviewing the cer-
tification decision "for abuse of discretion within the ambit of the controlling rules of substance and 
procedure." Id. at 680. 
623. Id. at 689 (quoting plaintiffs, without sourcing quotations). 
624. Id. at 690. 
625. Id. 
626. Id. at 690-91 (footnote omitted). 
62 7. Id. at 683 (explaining out-of-pocket damages as "the difference between the inflated price at 
which the plaintiffs bought their stock, buoyed by BP's alleged misrepresentations about the magni-
tude of the spill, and the 'true' price, meaning the theoretical price that the BP stock would have 
traded for had the relevant information been properly disclosed"). 
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deciding whether to purchase. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit employed, as an alterna-
tive basis for its ruling on the pre-spill class, the conclusion that the plaintiffs 
themselves rebutted the FOTM reliance presumption by taking the position 
that the pre-spill purchasers did not purchase on the basis of price alone. 628 
SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT ("SLUSA") 
SLUSA defines a "covered class action" as a lawsuit brought on behalf of more 
than fifty persons. 629 SLUSA requires that covered class actions be based on fed-
eral securities law and proceed in federal court if plaintiffs "alleg[e 'an untrue 
statement' or 'a misrepresentation'] or omission of a material fact in connection 
with the purchase or sale" of a "covered security"-essentially a security listed on 
a national exchange. 630 SLUSA forbids the "maint[enance]" of a covered class ac-
tion in which the plaintiffs make such an allegation where the class action is 
"based upon the statutory or common law of any State. "631 If plaintiffs file a cov-
ered class action in state court-asserting state law claims based on misrepresen-
tations or omissions in the purchase or sale of a covered security-defendants 
can remove the case to federal court. 632 The federal court then properly dis-
misses the case as precluded by SLUSA. 633 
The In re Kingate Management Ltd. Litigation plaintiffs purchased shares in funds 
(the "Funds")-which shares were not "covered securities"-after the Funds de-
clared that they would in turn invest in exchange-listed stocks issued by S&P 
100 companies-which stocks were "covered securities. "634 The Funds gave the 
money to Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BMIS"), and, although 
BMIS provided statements purporting to show that it had invested the money in 
shares issued by S&P 100 companies, BMIS in fact used the money for Mr. Madoff's 
personal benefit and to pay investors who sought to redeem amounts previously 
placed with BMIS. 635 In Kingate Management, the plaintiffs asserted a variety of 
628. Id. at 691. In one more open market case addressing loss causation, the Fifth Circuit held 
that neither news of government subpoenas served on the issuer nor an analyst report summarizing 
a whistleblower lawsuit filed months before that report constituted a "corrective disclosure" indepen-
dently and, even when considered together, they were not corrective. Sapssov v. Health Mgmt. 
Assocs., Inc., 608 F. App'x 855, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
629. 15 U.5.C. §§ 77p(f)(2)(A)(i), 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i) (2012). The statutes carve out derivative ac-
tions. Id. §§ 77p(f)(2)(B), 78bb(f)(5)(C) 
630. Id. § 77p(b)(l) (2012) (referring to "an untrue statement"); id. § 78bb(f)(l) (referring to "a 
misrepresentation"); see id. § 77p(f)(3) (cross-referencing the definition of "covered securities"); id. 
§ 78bb(f)(5)(E) (same). See generally id. § 77r(b) (defining "covered securities"). 
631. Id. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(l) 
632. Id. §§ 77p(c), 78bb(f)(2) 
633. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) ("[SLUSA] . 
denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action device to vindicate certain [state-law] claims."); 
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 54 7 U.S. 633, 64 3 (2006) ("§ 77p(c) 'provides that any class action 
described in Subsection (b) that is brought in a State court shall be removable to Federal district 
court, and may be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b)."' (quoting S. REP. No. 
105-182, at 8 (1998))); id. at 644 ("If the action is precluded, neither the district court nor the 
state court may entertain it, and the proper course is to dismiss."). 
634. 784 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 2015) 
635. Id. at 133-34. 
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state law claims against the Funds and individuals and entities affiliated with the 
Funds-including officers, directors, managers, auditors, a consultant, and a fund 
administrator. 636 The district court dismissed all of the claims as SLUSA-
precluded. 637 
The Second Circuit concluded that, because the plaintiffs bought uncovered 
securities, but expected that the proceeds of their purchases would be invested 
in covered securities, and because the proceeds were not so invested, "the essen-
tial element of SLUSA that requires falsity 'in connection with' a purchase or sale 
of a covered security is satisfied in this case."638 The court then turned to "the 
meaning of SLUSA's ambiguous use of the word 'alleging,' when it proscribes 
the 'maint [enance]' of a covered class action 'alleging ... [false conduct] in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a covered security,"' characterizing the issue 
as one of "first impression" in the Second Circuit. 639 The court rejected two pos-
sible interpretations: (i) "'alleging' . . mean[s] that SLUSA applies to any claim 
that includes any reference whatsoever to the false conduct specified in SLUSA, 
even if the false conduct is completely irrelevant to the state law theory of the 
defendant's liability"; and (ii) "alleging" does not cover "extraneous pleaded 
facts," but it "encompasses any assertion of the types of false conduct specified 
in SLUSA's references to the anti-falsity provisions of the [Securities and Exchange] 
Acts that must be proved in order for the state law claim to succeed-even when 
the defendant is not alleged to have participated in the falsity." 640 The Second Cir-
cuit instead selected a third interpretation: (iii) "alleging" means "that the com-
plaint must allege conduct by the defendant that is specified in SLUSA and that 
forms the basis for the defendant's state law liability."641 
This selection meant that "SLUSA's preclusion applies when the state law 
claim is predicated on conduct of the defendant specified in SLUSA's operative 
provisions, which reference the anti-falsity provisions of the [Securities and Ex-
change] Acts."642 The preclusion extends to a claim based on conduct by the de-
fendant that violates those anti-falsity provisions (i) even if the plaintiff has no 
private cause of action against the defendant under the federal securities laws, 
as would be true if the conduct violated only Rule lOb-5 and the plaintiff simply 
had held stock as a result of the defendant's conduct instead of having bought or 
sold securities as a result of that conduct,643 and (ii) even if the anti-falsity provi-
636. Id. at 133; id. at 134 (listing some of the claims as "fraud, constructive fraud, negligent mis-
representation, negligence, gross negligence, breach of contractual obligations, breach of fiduciary 
duties, constructive trust, mutual mistake, unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting various afore-
mentioned violations"). 
637. Id. at 135. 
638. Id. at 142. 
639. Id. at 143 (quoting 15 USC§§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(l) (2012)) 
640. Id. at 143-44 (articulating two interpretations); id. at 144-50 (rejecting those interpretations). 
641. Id. at 144, 149. The court provided examples of claims that, under its interpretation of "al-
leging," SLUSA does not bar. Id. at 148-49. 
642. Id. at 149. 
64 3. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)). 
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sion that the defendant's conduct allegedly violated does not create a private cause 
of action at all, as would be true if the conduct violated only section l 7(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act. 644 The Second Circuit emphasized that SLUSA's preclusion extends 
to state law claims based on such conduct, even though the state law claim (such as 
a breach of contract claim) does not, itself, require that the defendant have spoken 
or written a falsehood. 645 
The court of appeals applied this interpretation to the five relevant categories 
of the plaintiffs' allegations ("Groups l-5"). 646 The court concluded that 
Group 1-"predicat[ing] liability on charges that Defendants fraudulently 
made misrepresentations and misleading omissions regarding the Funds' in-
vestments with Madoff and their oversight of the Funds' investments"-alleged 
"falsity 'in connection with' covered securities" and "conduct by Defendants 
falling within SLUSA's specifications of conduct prohibited by the anti-falsity 
provisions of the [Securities and Exchange] Acts." 647 SLUSA precluded those 
allegations. 648 The Group 2 allegations differed from those in Group 1 only 
by charging that the defendants negligently made misrepresentations and omit-
ted material facts about "the Funds' investments with Madoff and ... oversight 
of Madoff's operations. "649 Because those allegations were based on the same 
conduct by the defendants-"conduct prohibited by not only the anti-fraud 
provisions of the [Exchange] Act, but also § l 7(a)(2) of the [Securities] 
Act,"650 which imposes culpability based on the defendant's negligence651-
the court saw "no reason why the absence of scienter should prevent SLUSA 
from barring the Group 2 allegations," and ordered that the district court "dis-
miss any allegations of the type defined as Group 2. "652 Similarly, the Group 3 
allegations-"that Defendants aided and abetted (rather than directly commit-
ted) the frauds described in Group l "-were SLUSA-precluded. 653 
The Second Circuit, however, held that SLUSA did not preclude the Group 4 
or Group 5 allegations. 654 The plaintiffs predicated Group 4 "on Defendants' 
breach of contractual, fiduciary, and/or tort-based duties to Plaintiffs to provide 
competent management, consulting, auditing, or administrative services to the 
Funds, thus allowing Madoff's frauds to go undetected, causing Plaintiffs' 
losses."655 Those allegations did not "requir[e] a showing of false conduct by 
644. Id. at 149-50 (citing Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
645. Id. at 149. The court also held that a district court on a SLUSA preclusion motion may "as-
certain ... independently" that the defendant's alleged false conduct involved "covered securities" 
where the complaint does not disclose the status of the securities involved. Id. at 150. 
646. Id. at 134-35 (identifying the categories). 




651. SEC v. Ginder, 752 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 2014). 
652. Kingate Mgmt., 784 F.3d at 151. 
653. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the SEC can pursue aiders and abettors, although private 
claimants cannot do so through claims under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 151 & n.22. 
654. Id. at 151-52. 
655. Id. at 151. 
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the named Defendants of the sort specified in SLUSA" and therefore survived a 
SLUSA preclusion attack. 656 The Group 5 allegations "assert[ed] that Plaintiffs 
are entitled to compensation for fees paid by the Funds to certain Defendants 
pursuant to contracts between the Funds and those Defendants because those 
Defendants failed to perform the duties for which the fees were paid, and be-
cause the fees based on purported profits and values of the Funds were com-
puted on the basis of inaccurate values. "657 Those allegations, too, survived 
SLUSA challenge because they did "not depend on conduct by Defendants within 
SLUSA's specifications"; indeed, those allegations did not depend on defendants 
having committed any deception at all. 658 
The Second Circuit follows the rule that, where SLUSA precludes some claims 
in a complaint but not others, the court should dismiss the precluded claims and 
proceed with the rest. 659 Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded for the dis-
trict court to dismiss the "claims (or portions thereof) [that] fall within the terms 
of SLUSA's preclusion" and "proceed with respect to the other claims. "660 
MISCELLANEOUS CASES 
The Eighth Circuit held last year that an issuer had violated Rule lOb-9 and 
Rule lOb-5 by breaking escrow and accessing funds in an all-or-none issuance 
before the issuer had actually received the minimum amount that the offering 
specified. 661 The Sixth Circuit held that Rule 15c3-3(l) does not create an im-
plied right of action. 662 In another case, the Sixth Circuit held that notes, sold 
to finance purchases of oil that would be held in tankers until the oil price in-
creased, fell within the "any note" phrase in the federal law definition of "secur-
ity."663 The Third Circuit found an interest in a limited liability company ("LLC") 
to fall outside the "investment contract" phrase in that definition, in part because 
of the role the purchaser played in a partnership that was legally different from, 
but was associated with, the LLC. 664 
656. Id. at 152. 
657. Id. 
658. Id. (emphasis added). 
659. Id. at 153 (citing Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 4 7 (2d 
Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 54 7 U.S. 71 (2006)). 
660. Id. at 153-54. 
661. Doud v. Toy Box Dev. Co., 798 F.3d 709, 712-14 (8th Cir. 2015). 
662. Harris v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., 805 F.3d 664, 666-67 (6th Cir. 2015). 
663. SEC v. Zada, 787 F.3d 375, 379-81 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing 15 USC § 77b(a)(l) (2012) 
(defining "security" to include "any note"); id. § 78c(a)(l0) (same)). 
664. Rossi v. Quarmley, 604 F. App'x 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that, because the plaintiff's 
"control of [the related partnership] was ... essential to the success of [the LLC]," his contribution to 
the LLC "was hardly limited to an investment of money, and his interest was not an investment con-
tract but a commercial venture"). 

